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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent federal legislative and judicial actions respond to business decisions and 
administrative practices transferring investment, financial, health care, and other 
social welfare risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government under terms, 
conditions, procedures, and requirements of employee benefit plans.  The transfer of 
risk and liability originates from two kinds of discretion and control over employee 
benefit plans.  The first source is the unilateral exercise of organizational discretion 
and judgment by business managers to allocate labor, financial, and other resources 
in the business management of employee benefit plans.  The second source is the 
rational exercise of administrative discretion and control by trustees and 
administrators to manage plan assets and perform administrative practices in the 
asset management and plan administration of employee welfare and pension benefit 
plans.  Federal legislative acts and judicial decisions respond to an organization’s 
business decisions and plan’s administrative practices in deciding whether these 
decisions and practices transfer too much social risk and individual liability to 
employees and retirees for employee welfare and retirement security.   
Organizational decisions and plan practices create and follow, respectively, 
global and domestic business outcomes and social consequences of transferring risk 
and liability to employees and retirees through plant closings and large layoffs, 
which cause losses of retirement and welfare benefits.  These decisions and practices 
transfer risk and liability for employee welfare and retirement security to the 
government by increasing the public cost of and participation in programs that 
provide medical assistance, supplemental retirement income, food assistance, and 
other social assistance.  Consequently, the federal legislative and judicial branches 
must scrutinize business decisions and administrative practices that transfer (or 
always leave) social risk and individual liability to employees and retirees.  Federal 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6
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scrutiny takes place in light of the fact that many American business organizations 
need broad, flexible organizational discretion and judgment to make American 
markets, industries, and organizations more competitive in an expanding global 
economy. 
The individual and governmental impact of transferring risk and liability results 
in increased responsibilities for employees and retirees, as well as more government 
social costs and programs for health care, retirement, and other needs.  If employees 
and retirees cannot provide their own employee welfare and retirement security 
(welfare and security) needs, then their failure to provide these needs causes 
employee and retiree hardships and increases government social costs.  These 
hardships and costs will eventually force Congress to adjust the policy objectives and 
statutory framework (objectives and framework) of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 19741 (ERISA).  Congress can recoup losses of employee 
welfare and retirement gains, or it can forego these gains of the last forty years in 
adjusting ERISA in view of less competitive American industries, markets, and 
organizations hobbled by much social risk and individual liability.  Federal 
legislative and judicial decisions amend and interpret, respectively, ERISA’s 
objectives and framework.  An amendment or interpretation decides whether ERISA 
should protect welfare and security interests or should forebear by transferring more 
social risk and personal liability to employees and retirees.  Ascertaining when 
ERISA should protect or forego protecting welfare and security interests is not so 
straightforward.  The Federal Judiciary and Congress must recognize the substantive 
issues and public policy challenges, respectively, threatening to undermine ERISA’s 
objectives and framework.  Specifically, federal judges and policy-makers must 
continuously scrutinize business outcomes and social consequences that underlie 
disputes and public policy concerns showing the transfer of more social risk and 
personal liability to employees, retirees, and government.  Federal scrutiny reviews 
both when and how business management and plan administration of American 
business organizations and employee benefit plans use social risk and liability in 
responding to unfavorable business outcomes that are reasonably attributable to 
global business competition.   
These august federal institutions determine whether business outcomes and social 
consequences that follow too closely on the heels of global and domestic conditions 
and events2 may cause the transfer of enough risk and liability to undermine 
                                                                 
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).  
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1461 and scattered sections of I.R.C.  (2006 & Supp. II 2009)), was amended by the 
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).  For a review of pertinent 
sections of ERISA and the Pension Protection Act (PPA), see infra Parts III and IV, 
respectively. 
2 See Evolution of an Economic Crisis?: The Subprime Lending Disaster and the Threat to 
the Broader Economy: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 1-3 (2008) 
[hereinafter Subprime Lending Disaster] (opening statement of Senator Charles E. Schumer, 
Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, describing the impact of American business 
transactions, namely the Subprime Crisis, on domestic and international economic conditions). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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ERISA’s objectives and framework.3  In a perplexing triple nexus of ERISA policy, 
ERISA’s framework creates welfare and security rights for employees and retirees 
(individuals), confers trust or administrative discretion to entities (fiduciaries) 
managing these rights, and preserves common law organizational discretion of 
voluntarily subservient employers providing benefits.  Federal legislative and 
judicial decision-makers must consider two issues in managing ERISA’s triple 
nexus.  First, they must consider whether ERISA obligations and rights of employees 
and fiduciaries can continuously further ERISA’s objectives and framework to 
protect employees and retirees of the domestic economy.  Second, they must 
consider whether business organizations retain so much organizational discretion that 
they are unnecessarily transferring too much risk and liability to employees, retirees, 
and government in trying to compete and revitalize American standing in the global 
economy.  These issues create challenging public policy and legislative choices 
between two classic antagonists—government regulation and private business.  Now, 
both must win, or the people will lose! 
This Article examines why federal legislative policy-makers and judicial 
decision-makers should ascertain the impact of the transfer of risk and liability on 
furthering welfare and security interests and preserving organizational discretion 
under ERISA and public policy.  Part I explains why business organizations or 
employers transfer risk and liability to employees and retirees.  This transfer occurs 
where global business outcomes cause social consequences that are driven directly 
by business decisions responding to new global competition and less American 
economic standing.4  Part II explains the need to assess the substantive issues and 
                                                                 
3 Id.  
4  See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 175-91 (1st ed. 2005).  Mr. Friedman states that “[i]t is this triple convergence—of 
new players, on a new paying field, developing new processes and habits for horizontal 
collaboration—that I believe is the most important force shaping global economics and 
politics in the early twenty-first century.”  Id. at 181-82. 
Commentators have forecasted economic standing and competitiveness of American 
industries, markets, and organizations in 2025 and thereafter.  Their assessments and forecasts 
should be addressed by Western public policy-makers.  See., e.g., Mathew J. Burrows & 
Jennifer Harris, Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis, THE WASH. 
Q., Apr. 2009, at 27 (relying on the National Intelligence Council’s 2025 forecast of the 
economic order of the world); Roger C. Altman, The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical 
Setback for the West, CURRENT, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 11 (stating that the global financial crisis 
will force the United States to operate from a smaller platform and will give China an 
opportunity to rise faster); Moin Siddiqi, Dawn of a New Economic Order, AFR. BUS., Apr. 
2006, at 48 (relying on the Goldman Sachs’ forecast in Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 
2050, which suggests that Brazil, Russia, India, and China (referred to as the BRICs) may 
challenge, if not overtake, the major economic powers of today’s global economy). 
Other commentators see the economic crisis of 2008 as a threat to globalization.  See Jean 
Pisani-Ferry & Indhira Santos, Reshaping the Global Economy, FIN. & DEV., Mar. 2009, at 8.  
Pisani-Ferry and Santos state that: 
Even before this crisis, globalization was already being challenged.  Despite 
exceptionally favorable global economic conditions, not everyone bought into the 
benefits of global free trade and movement of capital and jobs.  Although economists, 
corporations, and some politicians were supportive, critics argued that globalization 
favored capital rather than labor and the wealthy rather than the poor. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6
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public policy concerns underlying legislative acts and judicial interpretations limiting 
or permitting the transfer of risk and liability by employers.  Part II also explains the 
need to consider the impact of the global business environment on domestic business 
outcomes causing or leading to social consequences, such as less health care or 
retirement funds, transferring risk and liability to employees, and retirees.5  Part III 
discusses ERISA administrative and fiduciary obligations of plan sponsors,6 plan 
administrators,7 and trustees;8 and it explains the ERISA rights and claims of plan 
participants9 and beneficiaries.10  Part IV examines recent federal legislation 
                                                          
 
Now the crisis and the national responses to it have started to reshape the global 
economy and shift the balance between the political and economic forces at play in the 
process of globalization.  The drivers of the recent globalization wave—open markets, 
the global supply chain, globally integrated companies, and private ownership—are 
being undermined, and the spirit of protectionism has reemerged.  And once-footloose 
global companies are returning to their national roots. 
Id. 
5 See generally, Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2 (recognizing global and 
domestic impacts and implications of the looming financial crisis).  
6 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052-1054 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1082 (repealed 2005) (ERISA §§ 
202-204, 301-302) (establishing funding and vesting and other participation requirements); see 
infra Part III.A and accompanying notes.  In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (ERISA  § 
3(16)(B)), states that: 
The term “plan sponsor” means (i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit 
plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the employee organization in 
the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the 
case of a plan established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one or 
more employers and one or more employee organizations, the association, committee, 
joint board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the parties who 
establish or maintain the plan.  
7 See 29 U.S.C. § 1101-1109 (ERISA §§ 401-409) (establishing and listing fiduciary 
duties, breaches and liabilities); see infra Part III.C and accompanying notes.  Moreover, 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (ERISA  § 3(16)(A)) states that:  
The term “administrator” means— 
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which 
the plan is operated;  
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or  
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan 
sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by 
regulation prescribe.  
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (ERISA § 403(A)) (“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees.”); 
see also infra Part III.C and accompanying notes (discussing the duties and liabilities of the 
trustee as a fiduciary in asset management of plan assets). 
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (ERISA § 3(7)) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or 
former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee 
organization . . . .”). 
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adjusting ERISA’s framework by changing substantive requirements and 
administrative standards for asset management and plan administration of employee 
benefit plans in furthering security and welfare interests, preserving organizational 
discretion and enlarging administrative discretionary authority.  Part V analyzes a 
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to illustrate the substantive 
impact of ERISA’s interpretation on the transfer of risk and liability, namely 
investment risk and financial liability, by a plan administrator executing an 
investment decision of a plan beneficiary or participant.  Part VI explains the 
substantive and policy impacts and implications of recent legislative and judicial 
decisions that permit and limit the transfer of risk and liability by plan sponsors and 
administrators.  Finally, Part VII finds that policy-makers and business decision-
makers must come to grips with the fact that new global competition may accelerate 
the occurrence of unfavorable business outcomes, which, in turn, cause more social 
welfare consequences including fewer pension and welfare benefits.  Therefore, 
fewer employee benefits create a need for both Congress to scrutinize ERISA and 
public policy concerns, and for the Federal Judiciary to scrutinize substantive ERISA 
issues in deciding whether the transfer of risk and liability to employees, retirees, and 
governments greatly undermines, and therefore, justifies the immediate need to 
adjust ERISA’s objectives and framework in light of domestic and global business 
and social conditions. 
Notwithstanding recent ERISA amendments, it is not too early to consider 
whether Congress should adjust ERISA’s objectives and framework to address the 
transfer of risk and liability caused by unfavorable outcomes and consequences, such 
as plant closings and employee benefit plan terminations.  Many outcomes and 
consequences demand the vigilance and prudence of federal policy-makers in 
making new policy and regulation to further welfare and security interests and 
preserve organizational discretion and judgment.  These outcomes and consequences 
transfer risk and liability; but the threat to ERISA’s objectives and framework now 
occurs in domestic industries, markets, and organizations that need to respond to 
global business competition, as well as economic and political events.  Moreover, 
global competition may act as a catalyst that would accelerate the competitive effects 
of a lethargic mixture of global technology, labor, and talent on domestic industries, 
markets, or organizations.  It would also hasten the decline of support by employers 
for domestic social policies, such as welfare and security interests.  This competition 
may cause more frequent employee layoffs, plant closings, organizational failures, 
and other business outcomes, which would create business instability.  In fact, new 
or catalytic competition challenges Western geopolitical dominance and disrupts 
Western industries and markets, such as textiles and automobiles.  Simply, some 
American business organizations may not be competitive and face an uphill battle to 
overcome less American economic standing caused by a recent global economic 
crisis.  This lack of competitiveness, and perhaps less standing, cause plant closings, 
layoffs, and other business outcomes and will eventually lead to unfavorable social 
consequences.  Business organizations or employers respond to these outcomes and 
                                                          
 
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (ERISA § 3(8)) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person 
designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may 
become entitled to a benefit thereunder.”). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6
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create consequences by transferring risk and liability to employees, retirees, and 
government through the termination or modification of employee benefit plans.   
II.  NEED, CAUSE, AND MEANS TO ADJUST ERISA TO A TRANSFER OF RISK 
ERISA is exposed to the competition of global business and its impact on the 
needs of social welfare.  This competition is an indifferent economic catalyst that 
mimics how the addition of a catalytic agent to a chemical mixture increases the 
speed of a slow or lethargic chemical reaction.  Competition creates an active 
mixture of digital technology, bright global talent, and less costly labor in some 
foreign countries.  It causes an accelerating cascade of declining markets, industries, 
and business organizations that are unfavorable business outcomes with downward 
effects on levels of health care, pension, and other benefits.11  Oddly, ERISA must 
also preserve the organizational discretion of employers or business organizations 
that need to meet or exceed this new competition and its business outcomes.  Such 
outcomes now include domestic plant closings, worker layoffs, foreign off-shoring 
of production facilities, and outsourcing of jobs.12 
A.  Continuous Need to Adjust ERISA’s Objectives and Framework 
Congress enacted the Pension Protection Act of 200613 (PPA) to amend and 
further ERISA’s objectives and framework by addressing the impact of business 
outcomes and social consequences that had been cumulating for approximately three 
decades.14  In fact, ERISA still faces more business outcomes that could eventually 
lead to social consequences that transfer more risk and liability to employees, 
retirees, and government for retirement, health care, and other needs.  In 2007, the 
world faced an American-induced economic slowdown that weakened American 
economic standing in the global economy.15  This weaker standing coupled with 
global competition could lead to more unfavorable business outcomes.16  
Consequently, the PPA and a recent Supreme Court decision recognize the 
widespread use of riskier defined-contribution plans,17 and show that an ERISA 
                                                                 
11 See Altman, supra note 4, at 11; see Siddiqi, supra note 4, at 48.   
12 See Friedman, supra note 4, at 103-27. 
13 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
14 Id.  
15 See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
16 See id. (recognizing the economic impact of the subprime crisis on the domestic and 
global economy); Burrows & Harris, supra note 4, at 27; Altman, supra note 4, at 11; Siddiqi, 
supra note 4, at 48; but see Pisani-Ferry & Santos, supra note 4, at 12.   
17 See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).  In LaRue, the 
Court responds to the transfer of risk and liability plan procedures and requirements.  For an 
explanation of the implications and impact of LaRue on adjusting ERISA to address the 
transfer of risk and liability through administrative procedures and requirements, see infra Part 
VI and accompanying notes. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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policy is needed to closely scrutinize the impact and social consequences of these 
outcomes on the states.18  These business outcomes and social consequences will be 
accelerated by global business competition and, perhaps, by less American economic 
standing.19  These outcomes eventually lead to the provision of fewer employee plan 
benefits20 but are driven by new global competition.21  The social consequences of 
plant closings and other outcomes transfer risk and liability to employees, retirees, 
and government when plan sponsors terminate and modify employee welfare and 
pension benefit plans.   
B.  Changes to Industries, Markets, and Organizations Causing the Transfer of Risk  
In the past, employers provided a vast number of employee welfare needs and 
supported many government policies for employee welfare, retirement security, and 
other social interests.22  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, as employers 
                                                          
 
Equally important, the Court interprets ERISA based on the proliferation of defined-
contribution plans and their impact on retirement security when these plans are compared to 
the purposes and numbers of defined-benefit plans in existence at the enactment of ERISA. 
See infra Part V and accompanying notes.   
18 See infra Part VI.C and accompanying notes.  
19 Protecting the Pensions of Working Americans: Lessons from the Enron Debacle, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab., and Pensions, 107th Cong. 26 (2002) 
[hereinafter Protecting the Pensions] (recognizing that Congress enacted ERISA to protect 
pension plans and pension benefits approximately thirty-four years ago and that today many 
employers are switching to defined-contribution plans that have less stringent ERISA 
obligations than defined-benefit plans).   
The retirement security of today’s employees and retirees may be no better than the wants 
and hopes of at-will employees prior to the enactment of ERISA.  Today’s employees cannot 
fully rely on employers to perform obligations of retirement and welfare benefit plans.  See 
Daniel Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income—The Ideal, the Possible, and the 
Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 42-43, 61 (2003) (recognizing that employers may prefer defined-
contribution pension or retirement plans that permit them to retain discretion over 
contributions and transfer more risk and liability to employees).  Although ERISA provides 
retirement security and supports employee welfare, an employer’s decision to create employee 
benefit plans is a unilateral, terminable business decision. 
20 See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3. 
21 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 225-36 (finding that American companies are facing 
stiffer competition in the global economy but must compete by not relying on protectionist 
ideas and regulation); id. at 237-49 (discussing how American companies and individuals can 
respond to the global economy). 
22 See David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 
1601-02 (1996).  The late Professor Charny recognized the transition that America was about 
to undergo when he stated that:  
Throughout the postwar period, large-firm employers have provided a majority of full-
time workers with a fairly comprehensive set of welfare or social insurance 
entitlements.  Employee social insurance has come in two varieties.  First, firms have 
provided certain types of insurance directly, or contracted with private third parties to 
do so, and have bought or directly administered health insurance, pensions, 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6
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face stiffer global competition and uncertain American economic standing, they 
appear less able to support employee welfare and retirement security needs.  Many 
employers are relying on government health care, retirement assistance, and other 
social programs to provide assistance or aid to workers and employees.23  However, 
some employees are relying on ERISA’s objectives and framework to retain 
meaningful employee welfare and pension benefits.24  Employees should not expect 
much. 
Federal policy-makers preserve organizational discretion25 by not mandating 
these benefits under ERISA’s framework.26  Business organizations can respond 
unilaterally to business outcomes and ignore the social consequences for employees 
and retirees.27  In some instances, business organizations can establish nontraditional 
or contingent work relationships to increase organizational discretion (actually 
                                                          
 
unemployment insurance (in the form of severance pay, and job security and income 
guarantees), disability insurance, and life insurance. 
Id. at 1601.  However, catalytic global competition threatens to move America quickly beyond 
the initial transition and force federal policy-makers and private managers to reconsider the 
relationship between social welfare needs and organizational discretion more often.  See 
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and I.R.C.).  Perhaps the PPA was only one episode in 
addressing the eventual transfer of more employee welfare and retirement security needs to the 
employees and retirees. 
23 See Charny, supra note 22, at 1601-02. 
24 See, e.g., Paul J. Donahue, Plan Sponsor Fiduciary Duty for the Selection of Options in 
Participant-Directed Defined Contribution Plans and the Choice Between Stable Value and 
Money Market, 39 AKRON L. REV. 9, 12 (2006) (examining the fiduciary duty of plan sponsors 
of individual account plans where employers can choose investment options for the defined-
contribution plans but employees can choose one or more of these options and assume the 
investment risk for their investment decisions); Kimberly Lynn Weiss, Note, Directors’ 
Liability for Corporate Mismanagement of 401(K) Plans: Achieving the Goals of ERISA in 
Effectuating Retirement Security, 38 IND. L. REV. 817, 818 (2005) (recognizing the liability of 
directors of corporations where the corporation establishes and manages the assets of the 
401(k) plan); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of 
Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 163-65 (2004) (recognizing the 
need to protect and grow plan assets in furthering retirement security). 
25 See James E. Holloway, The Practical Entry and Utility of a Legal-Managerial 
Framework Without the Economic Analysis of Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 131, 151 n.21 
(2002) (“Hambrick and Finkelstein define managerial discretion as the ‘latitude of managerial 
action.’  ‘Managerial action is domains that executives operate in . . . .’ Most importantly, 
these domains include ‘resource allocation and administrative choices (e.g., reward systems 
and structure) and staffing.’”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Donald C. 
Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, Managerial Discretion: A Bridge Between Polar Views of 
Organizational Outcomes, in 9 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 369 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Straw 
eds., 1987))).  
26 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985). 
27 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 103-13 (using outsourcing that transfers less 
essential jobs and positions to foreign countries to compete in the global economy); id. at 114-
27 (using off-shoring that transfers production and service facilities to foreign countries to 
gain access to low-cost labor and create new markets to compete in the global economy). 
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flexibility), which thereafter transfers risk and liability to contract workers and 
employment organizations for welfare and security interests.28  ERISA faces both 
faster occurring domestic business outcomes and mounting social consequences, 
which are both driven by global economic competition and a weaker American 
economic standing.29  More competition and less standing are likely to send more 
challenging business outcomes rippling through American markets, industries, and 
organizations.30  These outcomes lead to the transfer of more risk and liability to 
employees, retirees, and governments when these organizations curtail employee 
benefit plans.31  
                                                                 
28 See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: 
Employment Law for Workers without Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 251-53 (2006) (examining the impact of atypical 
employment relationships on retirement security and employee welfare and recognizing the 
ineffectiveness of federal employment law); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of 
Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 1 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2003) (finding contingent work as a means to increase 
competitiveness in the global marketplace); James E. Holloway, A Primer on Employment 
Policy for Contingent Work: Less Employment Regulation Through Fewer Employer-
Employee Relations, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 27 (1994) (examining the contingent work 
relationship as an atypical employment relationship under federal employment law and 
policy). 
29 See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-2 (opening statement of Senator 
Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, illustrating the impact of 
American business transactions, namely the Subprime Crisis, on domestic and international 
economic policies).  Senator Schumer states that: 
We’ve seen it most clearly in the financial markets.  This summer’s credit 
crunch was in large measure attributable to the collapse of the U.S. subprime market.  
It shook Wall Street and required the emergency intervention of central banks 
throughout the world to restore liquidity to international credit markets. 
The news outside the financial markets, while not so stark, has been little better. 
We all saw the anemic August jobs report—for the first time in four years, the 
economy actually lost jobs.  Consumer spending—the engine behind much of our 
recent economic growth—has begun to slow down.  Most economists have lowered 
their already weak expectations about GDP growth even further.  For the first time in 
years, the “R word”—recession—is being discussed far and wide as a real possibility. 
Id. at 2. 
30 See Subprime Lending Disaster, supra note 2, at 1-3 (recognizing that the financial 
crisis may have a national and international economic impact); see FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 
225-36 (recognizing that American companies are facing stiffer competition in the global 
economy). 
31 Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2.  At a Congressional hearing in 2002, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, explained the social risks and individual liabilities facing American workers who 
depend on private retirement plans by identifying the “lessons [learned] from the Enron 
debacle so that we can strengthen America’s pension system and protect America’s workers.”  
Id. at 1.  Moreover, Senator Kennedy illustrated the impact of poor business management on 
retirement security and the need for ERISA in the American retirement system when he stated 
that: 
Sadly, Enron is not just an isolated tale of corporate greed.  Instead, the Enron 
debacle reveals a crisis of corporate values.  In America, people who work hard all 
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C.  Case Law and Legislation Illustrating the Impact of Adjusting to New Risks 
ERISA’s objectives and framework justify the scrutiny of unilateral and fiduciary 
plan decisions that transfer social risk and personal liability through managerial and 
administrative conduct of plan sponsors and administrators, respectively.32  LaRue v. 
                                                          
 
their lives deserve retirement security in their golden years.  It is wrong—dead 
wrong—to expect Americans to face poverty in retirement after decades of working 
and saving.  Enron has shown us that workers today do not have true retirement 
security. 
. . . . 
Enron is not an isolated example.  The retirement security of workers at many 
other major corporations has been similarly undermined. . . .   
A generation ago, Congress took action to safeguard pensions in response to an 
Enron-like debacle at Studebaker.  These protections for defined benefit plans included 
diversification requirements and Government insurance.  As many companies have 
abandoned the traditional defined benefit pension plans, 401(k) plans have become the 
bedrock of America’s pension system.  Today 401(k)’s [sic] offer few if any of these 
safeguards for workers’ retirement security; 401(k) plans are not professionally 
managed, they are exempt from diversification standards, and they are not backed by 
insurance. 
Id. at 1-2.  See also infra Part III.A (listing the policy objectives of ERISA set forth by 
Congress). 
32 See ERISA, The Foundation of Employee Health Coverage: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the 
Workforce, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter Foundation of Health Care] (opening 
statement by Representative Sam Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee 
Relations).  Representative Sam Johnson explained the impact of ERISA on health care in 
investigating “the role of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA, and how 
employers voluntarily improve and provide health insurance to millions of the nation’s 
workers under ERISA.”  Id. at 2.  Representative Johnson illustrated the impact of ERISA on 
the American health care coverage when he stated that: 
Thanks to ERISA, the largest number of Americans, 129 million Americans, 
receives health insurance through their employer.  I anticipate additional hearings in 
the coming months to examine such important topics as: 1) increasing the number of 
insured, especially employees of small businesses; 2) the effects of claims regulations 
released by the Department of Labor, as well as other regulatory burdens on employer-
provided health plans; 3) ensuring medical privacy; and 4) granting greater protection 
to workers enrolled in managed care plans. 
Over the past 26 years the ERISA preemption of state law has played a key role 
in providing health insurance to millions of Americans.  ERISA covers nearly 80 
percent of all workers in this nation.  ERISA allows employers and employees alike to 
agree on a vast array of benefits without significant government interference driving 
up the cost of health insurance. 
Of the estimated 43 million Americans without health insurance, 60 percent are 
small business owners and their families as well as their employees and their families.  
Affordable and accessible health insurance for small business enterprises is a priority 
for this Subcommittee.   
When you run a small operation it is absolutely critical that employees and their 
families are healthy.  People perform better when they have peace of mind, knowing 
their loved ones are healthy, safe and protected. 
Id. at 2-3. 
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DeWolff, Boberg & Associates,33 illustrates the need to scrutinize plan 
administrators’ decisions, which are protected by plan discretion, in view of 
ERISA’s framework, which purposely minimizes the transfer of financial risk and 
liability during the performance of regulated plan administration and asset 
management.34  LaRue interprets ERISA’s fiduciary standards and statutory claims 
where a plan administrator would have transferred investment risk, market 
uncertainty, and financial liability by using administrative practices governing the 
execution of a participant’s directed investment decision of an individual account.35  
Next, the PPA illustrates adjustments to ERISA’s objectives and framework as a 
result of new welfare and security needs to maintain the employee retirement and 
welfare gains of past decades.36  The loss of these gains would transfer risk and 
liability and continue the decline of defined-benefit plans, provision of fewer welfare 
benefits, and use of risk-shifting defined-contribution plans.37  The PPA is employee-
benefit legislation, and it responds, in part, to business outcomes that result partially 
from global competition.38  This competition creates the need for American business 
organizations to be more competitive or more responsive to technology, talent, and 
                                                                 
33 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). 
34 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025; see infra Part V.C and accompanying notes (explaining 
that Section 502(a)(2) protects plan participants of defined-contribution pension plans 
containing individual accounts). 
35 See infra Part V and accompanying notes (analyzing LaRue and its legal impact and 
policy implications for the adaptability and sustainability of ERISA’s policy objectives and 
statutory framework). 
36 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (discussing how PPA increases access to 
increase retirement security and employee welfare of employee benefit plans). 
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)-(c).  The pertinent provisions state: 
(b) Protection of interstate commerce and beneficiaries by requiring disclosure and 
reporting, setting standards of conduct, etc., for fiduciaries.  It is hereby declared to be 
the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and 
reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with 
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, 
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.  
 
(c) Protection of interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and beneficiaries by 
vesting of accrued benefits, setting minimum standards of funding, requiring 
termination insurance.  It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to 
protect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants 
in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character 
and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of 
employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding, 
and by requiring plan termination insurance.  
Id. 
38 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of  I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).  The 
Preamble of the PPA is extremely general but states, “An Act [t]o provide economic security 
for all Americans, and for other purposes.”  Id. 
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labor that influences global competitiveness.39  Consequently, the PPA preserves 
organizational discretion, which can be used by employers or plan sponsors to 
manage employee benefit plans and exercise economic power to meet and exceed 
new competition in the global economy.   
LaRue and the PPA illustrate how Congress and Federal courts adjust ERISA’s 
framework by responding to a single incident and the mounting effects, respectively, 
of transferring risk and liability to employees, retirees, and state and federal 
governments.  LaRue and the PPA collectively allow ERISA’s framework to protect 
benefits promised to employees, urge employers to sponsor plans, govern fiduciaries 
conducting plan administration, and regulate trustees performing asset 
management.40  LaRue and the PPA also allow ERISA’s framework to preserve the 
organizational discretion and judgment that is needed to compete in the global 
economy that is most unlike the world of 1974.41  Finally, LaRue and the PPA 
illustrate the potential for great discord among the competing interests and 
conflicting claims of ERISA’s framework.42 
III.  NATURE OF ERISA OBLIGATIONS, BREACHES, AND LIABILITIES   
ERISA’s framework mandates employee benefit plans and fiduciary obligations 
and identifies fiduciary and other liabilities for breaches of duty in creating, 
administering, and managing employee benefit plans and their assets.43  This 
framework also creates plan and statutory duties and rights, and it provides 
substantive claims and remedies for plan participants and beneficiaries.44  ERISA 
grants more protection to pension and retirement benefit plans than welfare benefit 
plans.45  For plan sponsors, it preserves much organizational discretion in the 
business management and plan administration of employee welfare benefits.46  
ERISA grants less protection to retirement benefits of defined-contribution plans by 
not requiring plan sponsors to fund these plans and allowing plan sponsors to make 
                                                                 
39 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 71-80 (discussing the use of digital and other 
technologies to collaborate and the use of new talent in other parts of the world).   
40 See infra Part III and accompanying notes (explaining that ERISA imposes obligations 
on plan sponsors and fiduciaries as well as providing rights and claims for plan participants 
and beneficiaries). 
41 See infra Part VI.C and accompanying notes. 
42 See infra Part VI.B & C and accompanying notes. 
43 See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 203, 88 Stat. 829, 854 (1974) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)) (establishing minimum vesting requirements for 
employee pension plans); see ERISA § 302, 88 Stat. at 869 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1082 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)) (establishing minimum funding standards for employee 
pension plans). 
44 See ERISA § 502, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). 
45 See ERISA § 301, (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1)). 
46 See id.  
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discretionary contributions.47  ERISA preserves some organizational discretion in 
creating or establishing defined-contribution plans,48 such as 401(k) plans.49  ERISA 
permits the transfer of some investment risk and financial liability to plan 
participants who accept this risk and liability when they make investment decisions 
for funds in their individual accounts of defined-contribution plans.50  
A.  Fiduciary and Administrative Duties but Preserving Organizational Discretion 
ERISA is a comprehensive statute containing administrative, fiduciary, and 
enforcement provisions.51  ERISA does not mandate employee welfare and pension 
benefits.52  It exercises no control over the substantive contents of employee benefit 
plans.53  It mandates guidelines for the creation and administration of employee 
benefit plans,54 such as requiring plans to be in writing.55  Foremost, ERISA imposes 
fiduciary obligations on plan administrators, trust managers, and plan sponsors.56  
Section 40157 contains coverage and exceptions to fiduciary obligations, breaches of 
these obligations, and liabilities for breaching these obligations.58  Section 40259 
includes obligations of plan fiduciaries and plan sponsors, such as requiring these 
plans to be in writing and to list plan fiduciaries. 60  Section 402 imposes obligations 
on plan sponsors and administrators to govern the operation and administration of 
employee benefit plans.61  The Section lists the requisite features of employee benefit 
plans.62  Next, Section 402 requires a “procedure for establishing and carrying out a 
                                                                 
47 See Pension Protection Act §§ 101-07, 111-16, 201-06, 211-14, 221, 301-03, 901-06 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (a)(7)-(8), (a)(10)) (imposing new vesting, funding 
and other requirements on defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans). 
48 See id. (exempting some plans from ERISA’s funding requirements).  ERISA permits 
employers to create special or nonqualified plans for executives and exempt these plans from 
funding requirements.  See Pension Protection Act § 201(c)(1) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3)). 
49 I.R.C. § 401(k) (amending Pension Protection Act § 827). 
50 See ERISA § 404(c)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104). 
51 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 517-16 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993)). 
52 See ERISA § 2 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
53 Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732. 
54 ERISA § 401 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1101). 
55 ERISA § 402(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)). 
56 ERISA § 401 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1101). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 ERISA § 402(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. § 402(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)). 
62 Id. 
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funding policy and method consistent with the objectives of the plan . . .”63 and 
“procedure under the plan for the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and 
administration of the plan . . . .”64  Other features of Section 402 include a 
“procedure for amending such plan, and for identifying the persons who have 
authority to amend the plan . . . .”65  Section 402 obligates plan sponsors to design 
and implement employee benefit plans and includes functional features for plan 
administration and asset management by plan sponsors, administrators, and 
trustees.66 
ERISA also regulates asset management and plan administration by imposing 
fiduciary standards and creating ERISA functions of asset management and plan 
administration, but permitting plan sponsors to be a plan fiduciary in some 
capacities.67  Section 3(21)’s68 definition of a fiduciary is consistent with ERISA’s 
objectives and framework of not mandating employee benefit plans but regulating 
plan creation, administration, and asset management.  Section 3(21)(A)(i) states that, 
“a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent [that] he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan 
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets . . . .”69  The Supreme Court has concluded that ERISA’s definition of 
fiduciary “str[ikes] a balance that [Congress] believed would protect plan 
participants without impinging on the ability of employers to make business 
decisions.”70  “ERISA allows trustee-beneficiary arrangements that the common law 
of trusts generally forbids . . . .”71  Consequently, “Congress ‘defined “fiduciary” not 
in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of control and authority over 
the plan.’”72  ERISA’s definition of fiduciary preserves organizational discretion and 
furthers retirement security interests by not imposing restrictive mandates on the 
                                                                 
63 Id. § 402(b)(1). 
64 Id. § 402(b)(2). 
65 Id. § 402(b)(3). 
66 Id. § 402(a), (b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), (b)); see supra notes 59-
65 and accompanying text. 
67 ERISA § 402(c) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)).  
68 Id. § 3(21)(A) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)). 
69 Id. § 3(21)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)).  A person may 
also be considered a fiduciary to the extent that:  
(ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, 
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan.  Such term includes any person 
designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29 USCS § 1105(c)(1)(B)]. 
Id. § 3(21)(A)(ii)-(iii) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii), (iii)) (alteration in 
original). 
70 Varity, 516 U.S. at 527. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993)). 
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management of business assets, except in the funding of defined-benefit pension 
plans. 
The extent of ERISA’s fiduciary duties that are imposed on plan sponsors and 
fiduciaries in their control and authority over plan administration and asset 
management was examined in Varity v. Howe.73   
[A] person “is a fiduciary with respect to a plan” only “to the extent” that 
“he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.”74  This definition of fiduciary “is designed, 
in part, so that an employer that administers its own plan is not a fiduciary 
to the plan for all purposes and at all times . . . .”75   
Thus, the plan sponsor that is not exercising discretionary authority or control has no 
fiduciary obligations under Section 404.76  This limit on the fiduciary obligations of 
plan sponsors preserves organizational discretion in the management of business 
assets and other matters.77   
Section 403(a)78 mandates that plan assets be held in trust and under the authority 
of a trustee who has authority to manage plan assets.79  Section 40480 lists fiduciary 
duties of plan administrators and trustees by establishing a “prudent man” standard.81  
Section 404 also includes the exclusive benefit rule by stating that “a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries . . .”82 and manage plan assets solely “(a) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . .”83  Finally, Section 
404 imposes the prudent man standard on plan trustees and asset managers by 
requiring “the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” 84   
                                                                 
73 Varity, 516 U.S. 489. 
74 Id. at 527 (quoting ERISA § 3(21)(A)(iii) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A)(iii))).    
75 Id. at 527-28. 
76 Id. at 528. 
77 See id. at 527-28. 
78 ERISA § 403(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)) (“Except as provided in 
subsection (b) [of this section], all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by 
one or more trustees.”). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 404(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. § 404(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)). 
83 Id. § 404(a)(1)(A)(i) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)). 
84 Id. § 404(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)).  Section 404 
imposes other prudent person standards by requiring trustees and other fiduciaries to exercise 
reasonable or prudent care: 
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B.  Section 502(a) Claims for Breaches of Plan and Administrative Obligations 
ERISA establishes liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty under unique claims 
and remedies.  Section 40985 lists the liabilities of a fiduciary for a breach of a 
fiduciary duty.86  Section 409 states that “[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties 
imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good 
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach . . . .”87  However, 
Section 409 contains no enforcement actions.88  ERISA provides statutory claims to 
challenge and recover for breaches of fiduciary and other duties by plan sponsors, 
administrators, trustees, and others.  ERISA places the enforcement of fiduciary and 
other duties and recovery for breaches of these duties in Section 502.89  ERISA 
establishes unique claims for civil wrongs committed by plan sponsors, 
administrators, and trustees in the plan administration and asset management of 
employee benefit plans.90 
                                                          
 
     (C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and  
     (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar 
as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and 
title IV.   
Id. § 404(a)(1)(C), (D) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C), (D)).   
85 Id. § 409(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)). 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  As codified, Section 405, 29 U.S.C. § 1105, lists the liabilities of a co-fiduciary for 
breaches of fiduciary duties.  As codified, Section 405 states: 
(a) Circumstances giving rise to liability.  In addition to any liability which he may 
have under any other provisions of this part, a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be 
liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the 
same plan in the following circumstances:  
(1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or 
omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach;  
(2) if, by his failure to comply with section 1104(a)(1) of this title in the 
administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a 
fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or  
(3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes 
reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach.  
Id. § 1105(a)(1)-(3). 
88 See id. § 409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109); but see id. § 502(a)(2) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)) (providing a civil action for a violation of § 
409 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1109)). 
89 Id. § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132). 
90 Id. The pertinent provisions of Section 502 as codified, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, reads as 
follows: 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action.  A civil action may be brought— 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary— 
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or  
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ERISA permits plan participants and beneficiaries to file claims to protect their 
rights and enforce duties under the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans.91  
ERISA grants plan beneficiaries and participants statutory rights and other 
protection, but these rights and protection were not available prior to ERISA under 
federal regulation or state common law.92  ERISA’s statutory claims are distinct from 
common law contract, trust, and other claims.93  These claims include the failure to 
report and disclose information,94 establish terms to modify and terminate employee 
benefits plans,95 and conform to fiduciary standards in the administration of 
employee benefit plans.96  The federal courts can hear and review ERISA claims by 
interpreting and applying ERISA and supplementing ERISA with federal common 
law of trust, contract, employment, and corporations.97  Section 502(a)(1)(B)98 
                                                          
 
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 
the terms of the plan;  
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate 
relief under section 1109 of this title;  
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice 
which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to 
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce 
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; 
Id. § 1132(a)(1)-(3).  
91 See id. § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132). 
92 Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001). 
93 Id. § 502(a)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).  Federal courts 
had permitted common law contract claims in construing terms and conditions of employee 
benefit plans before the enactment of ERISA.  See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., 
Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971) 
(recognizing a contractual claim for unlawful termination of a retirement benefit plan).  
ERISA, as codified, creates and permits only ERISA claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), for unlawful termination and modification of employee benefit plans. 
See DeGeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. 
DeGeare v. Slattery Group, Inc., 489 U.S. 1049 (1989). 
94 Id. §§ 101-111 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031). 
95 Id. § 402(b)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)).  For a more detailed 
analysis of the application of Section 402(b)(3) to plan modifications and terminations, see 
James E. Holloway & Douglas K. Schneider, ERISA, FASB, and Benefit Plan Amendments: A 
Section 402(b)(3) Violation as a Loss Contingency for a Plan Amendment, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 97 
(1997); James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision as a Disclosure Function: 
Including Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section 402(b)(3), 46 
DRAKE L. REV. 755 (1998). 
96 Id. §§ 401-414 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114). 
97 See id. § 514(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).  As codified, Section 
514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), is the ERISA preemption provision.  The Court has concluded 
that Section 514(a) requires the federal judiciary to develop a federal common law of trusts, 
contracts, and other fields to supplement ERISA.  See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 
41, 56 (1987).  The Court has given the ERISA preemption provision a broad interpretation.  
See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981).  Section 514(a), as 
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enforces the rights of a plan participant or beneficiary “under the terms of his plan . 
. . to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”99  Section 
502(a)(1)(B) permits only ERISA plan-based claims to enforce obligations owed by 
the plan, but it requires the plan participant or beneficiary to comply with the 
administrative and procedural requirements of the plan.100  Plan participants and 
beneficiaries can file claims for an unlawful denial, termination, or modification of 
plan pension and welfare benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B)101 of ERISA.102   
C.  Section 502(a) Claims for Breaches of Fiduciary Obligations Under Section 1109 
Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3)103 enforce the fiduciary duties of Section 404 
and establish liabilities under Section 409 and other ERISA sections that protect 
employee benefit plans, plan participants, and beneficiaries.  Section 502(a)(2) 
empowers plan participants, beneficiaries, and others to bring claims by stating that 
“[a] civil action may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary 
or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 [Section 409] of this title.”104  
                                                          
 
codified, states that ERISA provisions “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  The 
Court has concluded that a broad interpretation of Section 514 establishes uniform and 
consistent federal employee benefit regulation.  See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 732.  
Consequently, ERISA preempts state health care, taxation, employment, and other policies, 
and states can do little to mandate employer-sponsored health care and other benefits.  Id. 
98 ERISA § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). 
99 Id.  
100 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1027 (2008) (Roberts, 
C.J., concurring). 
101 ERISA § 502(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). 
102 See DeGreare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and 
remanded, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
103 ERISA § 502(a)(2)-(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3)). 
104 Id. § 1132(a)(2).  The ERISA enforcement scheme permits the Department of Labor to 
impose civil penalties on fiduciaries.  Id. § 1132(l).  The pertinent provision of Section 502(l), 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(l), reads: 
(l) Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries  
(1) In the case of—  
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) part 4 
of this subtitle by a fiduciary, or  
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other 
person,  
The Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other person in an 
amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery amount.  
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “applicable recovery amount” means 
any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or other person with respect to a 
breach or violation described in paragraph (1)—  
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or  
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to a plan or 
its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary 
under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5) of this section.  
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In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,105 the Court concluded that a 
plan participant in an employee disability plan that paid a fixed level of benefits 
could not bring a Section 502(a)(2) claim to recover consequential damages caused 
by a delay in the processing of a disability claim.106  As discussed below, LaRue 
raised a similar issue: whether Section 502(a)(2) “authorizes a participant in a 
defined-contribution pension plan to sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct 
impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s individual account.”107  Unlike 
Russell, LaRue provides a Section 502(a)(2) claim and equitable relief for individual 
account plans.108  An individual account plan does not pay a fixed or defined benefit, 
and the asset management by a plan participant of an individual account is somewhat 
similar to plan asset management by a trustee of a defined-benefit pension plan.109  A 
decade after Russell and before LaRue, Varity concluded that Section 502(a)(2) 
provided only equitable relief and not compensatory or consequential damages.110  
Section 502(a)(3) grants plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries the right 
to bring claims under ERISA by “enjoin[ing] any act or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan or . . . obtain[ing] other 
appropriate equitable relief . . . to redress such violations or . . . to enforce any 
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan. . . .”111  In Varity, the Court 
made findings and conclusions of law on the interpretation and application of 
ERISA’s fiduciary standards.112  Section 502(a)(3) permits beneficiaries to seek 
remedial relief.113  Moreover, Section 409 is not a limitation on Section 502(a)(3), 
though it operates as a limitation on Section 502(a)(2).114  Section 502(a)(3) includes 
                                                          
 
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary’s sole discretion, waive or reduce the 
penalty under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing that—  
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, or  
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will not be able 
to restore all losses to the plan (or to provide the relief ordered pursuant to subsection 
(a)(9) of this section) without severe financial hardship unless such waiver or 
reduction is granted.  
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this subsection with 
respect to any transaction shall be reduced by the amount of any penalty or tax 
imposed on such fiduciary or other person with respect to such transaction under 
subsection (i) of this section and section 4975 of title 26.  
Id. § 1132(l). 
105 Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
106 Id. at 148. 
107 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1022. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1025. 
110 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 506, 507 (1996).  
111 ERISA § 502(a)(3) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). 
112 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 507. 
113 See id. at 515 (relying on ERISA’s remedial scheme for providing equitable relief). 
114 See id. at 507. 
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a limitation that restricts or limits the remedy or recovery for personal and plan 
financial losses to equitable relief.115  Moreover, an insurance company cannot 
recover damages for personal liability requested as a form of restitution where such 
an equitable remedy was merely a recovery of an earlier payment of money.116  
Likewise, a plan participant has no legal remedy against a nonfiduciary that 
knowingly participated in a breach of a fiduciary duty that caused the employee 
benefit plan to suffer financial losses.117  Thus, Section 502(a)(3) claims are limited 
to equitable relief for liabilities caused by acts and practices in violation of ERISA or 
plan terms. 
The Court has noted that Section 502(a)(1)(B)118 claims are for a wrongful denial 
of employee welfare and pension benefits under plan terms, but these claims may be 
confused with Section 502(a)(2) claims for practices and acts alleging a breach of a 
fiduciary duty.119  In LaRue, the petitioner, “LaRue, did not rely on § 502(a)(1)(B) as 
a source of relief, and the courts below had no occasion to address the argument, 
raised by an amicus in this Court, that the availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B) 
precludes LaRue’s fiduciary breach claim.”120  The Court did not address the 
preclusion of the Section 502(a)(2) claim, but sought to briefly clarify the distinction 
between claims under Section 502(a) and the consequences of confusing Section 
502(a) claims.121  The Court acknowledged, but left unresolved, the issue regarding 
the most appropriate claim for a violation of fiduciary duty under Section 502(a) that 
threatens to undermine employee benefit plans and ERISA procedural safeguards 
developed under Section 502(a)(1)(B).122  Thus, procedural safeguards imposed by 
                                                                 
115 See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that 
an insurance company could not recover a legal remedy when it attempted to recover 
restitution for benefits it had conferred on a beneficiary); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 
248 (1993) (holding that a plan participant could not recover money damages against a 
nonfiduciary where this participant had suffered losses as a result of the nonfiduciary’s 
participation in a breach of a fiduciary duty).  
116 Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220-21. 
117 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262-63. 
118  ERISA § 502(a)(1)(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). 
119 See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1026-27 (2008) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 1027 (citing Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008), 
at 13-30). 
121 Id. at 1028. 
122 Id. at 1027.  Chief Justice Roberts stated in a concurring opinion that: 
The significance of the distinction between a § 502(a)(1)(B) claim and one 
under § 502(a)(2) is not merely a matter of picking the right provision to cite in the 
complaint. Allowing a § 502(a)(1)(B) action to be recast as one under § 502(a)(2) 
might permit plaintiffs to circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have 
developed under § 502(a)(1)(B).  Among these safeguards is the requirement, 
recognized by almost all the Courts of Appeals, see Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 162 F.3d 410, 418 n.4 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing cases), that a participant exhaust the 
administrative remedies mandated by ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133, before filing 
suit under § 502(a)(1)(B).  Equally significant, this Court has held that ERISA plans 
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ERISA and precedents, and those permitted by plans should not be exposed to an 
unnecessary review but could be exposed where confusion exists in choosing 
between a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim or Section 502(a)(2) claim.123   
The Court noted that such exposure and confusion would undermine the plan 
authority of the plan administrators, who can invoke procedural safeguards and 
standards of review under Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims challenging the 
implementation and interpretation of plan terms and conditions of employee benefit 
plans.124  Ultimately, the Court must determine whether administrative acts and 
practices protected by plan terms or plan discretion permit plan sponsors, 
administrators, or trustees to transfer too much risk and liability to employees and 
retirees under ERISA’s framework.  However, the PPA is Congress’s response to 
business outcomes and social consequences of plan sponsors’ decisions and plan 
administrators’ and trustees’ practices in the administration and asset management of 
employee benefit plans.125  These social consequences of transferred health, 
financial, and other types of risk and liability to employees and retirees for employee 
welfare and retirement security needs, such as medical care and retirement 
planning.126 
IV.  PENSION PROTECTION ACT AND ITS IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 
Employers exercise organizational discretion to decide the amount and kind of 
liability and risk to transfer, such as offering fewer welfare benefits and transferring 
asset management to plan participants.127  On one hand, employers are establishing 
                                                          
 
may grant administrators and fiduciaries discretion in determining benefit eligibility 
and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review only for an abuse of 




125 See The Retirement Security Crisis: The Administration’s Proposal for Pension Reform 
and Its Implications for Workers and Taxpayers: Hearing before the Comm. on Education and 
the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (Mar. 2, 2005) 
[hereinafter Retirement Security Crisis] (Opening Statement of Honorable John A. Boehner, 
Chairman, Committee on Education and the Workforce, describing the nature of the retirement 
security crisis).  Representative Boehner recognizes the impact of global competition and 
domestic business conditions on retirement security by stating that: 
We’re entering a new kind of economy, with new kinds of products, services, 
industries, and business models, and to succeed in this knowledge-and-innovation-
driven economy, we need to be able to invest, and we can’t do that if outdated pension 
rules make it impossible for employers to adequately budget for their pension costs 
from year to year. 
Retirement Security Crisis, supra at 2.  Representative Boehner also recognizes that retirement 
security consists of “Social Security, private pensions, and 401K savings plans,” id. at 4, and 
that these public and private retirement plans are under scrutiny by Congress for different 
reasons.  Id. 
126  See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3; see Foundation of Health Care, 
supra note 32, at 3. 
127  See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
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fewer defined-benefit pension plans128 and no longer provide guarantees of a specific 
amount of income at retirement.129  They are establishing a greater number of 
defined-contribution pension plans,130 such as profit-sharing plans,131 for new and old 
employees.132  On the other hand, plan sponsors or employers are granting fewer 
healthcare, dental, and other welfare benefits133 of employment and retirement.134  
The PPA is a legislative response to this impact of business outcomes and their 
                                                                 
128 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35)  (“The term ‘defined benefit plan’ means a pension plan 
other than an individual account plan; except that a pension plan which is not an individual 
account plan and which provides a benefit derived from employer contributions which is 
based partly on the balance of the separate account of a participant.”). 
129 See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2.  At this congressional hearing, 
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions in the United States Senate, stated, “As many companies have abandoned the 
traditional defined benefit pension plans, 401(k) plans have become the bedrock of America’s 
pension system.”  Id. 
130 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)  (“The term ‘individual account plan’ or ‘defined 
contribution plan’ means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each 
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant’s 
account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other 
participants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.”). 
131 See I.R.C. § 401(k).   
132 See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 3.  In the hearing on protecting pension 
benefits, Senator Kennedy also identified the personal risks accompanying the reliance on 
401(k) plans.  Id. at 2.  In fact, he stated that “[t]oday 401(k)’s offer few if any of these 
safeguards for workers’ retirement security; 401(k) plans are not professionally managed, they 
are exempt from diversification standards, and they are not backed by insurance.”  Id. 
133 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).  Section 1002(1) states:   
(1) The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and “welfare plan” mean any plan, 
fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an 
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, 
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) 
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, 
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or 
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal 
services. . . .  
Id. 
134  See Foundation of Health Care, supra note 32, at 2 (opening statement of 
Representative Sam Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, 
Committee on Education and the Workforce).  At this congressional hearing, Representative 
Johnson stated: 
I look forward to the witness discussion of the role of ERISA in providing health 
coverage to our 129 million workers. The Subcommittee must be responsive to 
shortcomings in the health care system, but we must also insist on workable solutions 
that do not erode coverage or make cost unaffordable.  
We need to expand access to more affordable health insurance and reduce the 
number of uninsured. 
Id. at 3. 
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social consequences on ERISA and its employee welfare and retirement security 
policy.135  Thus, a review of the purposes, rights, and duties of a few PPA 
amendments shows how Congress responds to business outcomes and social 
consequences threatening to undermine ERISA’s objectives and framework.136   
A.  Providing Retirement Security, Information, and Financial Advice   
The PPA imposes new disclosure, fiduciary, and administrative obligations on 
plan administrators, plan sponsors, and asset managers of employee welfare and 
pension benefit plans.137  To illustrate, Section 501 amends ERISA and provides 
more financial security and stability under Section 101(f)138 of ERISA by adding 
plan funding requirements to minimize underfunding and plan termination of 
defined-benefit pension plans.139  Section 501 also provides notice and disclosure 
requirements that require plan participants and beneficiaries to receive funding 
notices and other information from multiemployer plans140 and single-employer 
plans.141  Similarly, Section 502(c)142 amends Section 204(h)(1)143 of ERISA by 
requiring multiemployer plans to notify employers of plan amendments that 
significantly reduce future benefit accruals.144  Other disclosure requirements include 
Section 506,145 which amends Section 4041146 of ERISA by establishing disclosure 
requirements for single-employer plans on the termination of pension plans.147  
Likewise, Section 508148 amends Section 105(a)149 by requiring plan administrators 
of individual account plans and defined-benefit plans to provide pension benefit 
                                                                 
135 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes (listing and explaining newly created ERISA 
rights that were granted to plan participants and beneficiaries to maintain employee gains in 
employee welfare and retirement security and recognizing that plan sponsors are offering 
defined-contribution pension plans transferring investment risk and financial liability for 
retirement planning and health care needs to employees). 
136 See id.  
137 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, tit. V, §§ 501-02, 506, 508, 120 
Stat. 780, 935-52 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and  I.R.C. (2006 & 
Supp. II 2009)). 
138 Id. § 101(f) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)(2)(B)(i)(I)). 
139 See id. § 501(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. § 502(c) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)). 
143 ERISA § 4041 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C § 1054(h)(1)). 
144 Pension Protection Act § 502 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1021(f)). 
145 Id. § 506 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)). 
146 ERISA § 4041 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341). 
147 Pension Protection Act § 506 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)). 
148 Id. § 508 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)). 
149 ERISA § 105 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025). 
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statements to plan participants or beneficiaries on a regular or specific schedule.150  
The PPA recognizes the uncertainty, risk, and liability of retirement planning when 
plan participants make financial investment and other decisions with inaccurate, 
incomplete, or untimely information.151 
The PPA provides more access to investment advice by plan participants, more 
discretionary authority to plan administrators, and more organizational discretion to 
plan sponsors.  The PPA amends ERISA’s exempted transactions provision that 
directly affects plan administration and asset management of individual account 
plans,152 such as 401(k).  ERISA’s exempted transactions provision prohibits plan 
sponsors and administrators from providing investment advice and collecting a fee 
from plan participants and beneficiaries for such advice.153  Yet, many plan 
participants who rely primarily on defined-contribution plans need investment advice 
and education on consumption, retirement, and estate planning.  Thus, Section 601154 
of the PPA amends Section 408155 of ERISA by adding a statutory exemption to the 
prohibited transactions provision.156  Section 601 of the PPA permits fiduciaries to 
provide investment advice to plan participants and beneficiaries of individual 
account plans, such as the 401(k) plan, under eligible investment advice 
arrangements.157  The Section 601 exemption for financial advisers allows 
                                                                 
150 Pension Protection Act § 508 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a)). 
151 Id. §§ 501-02, 506, 508 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 
I.R.C. (2006 & Supp. II 2009)); see supra notes 155-177 and accompanying text (explaining 
ERISA disclosure, fiduciary, and administrative obligations imposed by the Pension 
Protection Act). 
152 Id. §§ 601, 611-612, 621-625 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4975 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1002, 1104, 1108, 1112, 1141). 
153 See ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)). 
154 Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)). 
155 ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108). 
156 Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)). 
157 Id.  Section 601 amends 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b), Exempted Transactions, by adding a new 
exemption that provides retirement planning advice to plan participants but raises some 
financial service, legal, and public policy concerns.  See Jon O. Shimabukuro, Investment 
Advice and the Pension Protection Act of 2006, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Mar. 11, 2008, at 
CRS-1 (stating that the CRS Report “provides background information on investment advice 
and fiduciary responsibilities imposed by ERISA” and examines provisions of the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 that amend ERISA to establish new rules dealing with the provision of 
investment advice to plan participants by qualified investment advisers.). 
On January 21, 2009, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued final regulations on the 
implementation of Congress’s statutory exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14), and its class 
exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1), at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2 (2009).  
Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 3822 (Wednesday, Jan. 21, 
2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice I] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).  DOL provides 
an overview of the comments and its responses to these comments on implementing the final 
regulations of eligible investment advice arrangement.  Investment Advice I, supra at 3822-
46.   
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fiduciaries to charge and receive a counseling fee from plan beneficiaries for the 
receipt of investment advice to aid in the financial management of both participants’ 
and sponsors’ contributions to individual account plans.158  This investment advice 
must be given by fiduciary advisers who are governed by fiduciary obligations and 
liability of ERISA’s framework.159  Moreover, the PPA contains other exemptions 
for prohibited transactions involving asset management by plan fiduciaries.  Section 
611160 amends Section 408 of ERISA and Section 4975161 of the Internal Revenue 
                                                          
 
On March 20, 2009, the DOL delayed implementation of 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2 
(2009), until May 22, 2009.   Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 
11847 (Friday, Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice II] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2550).  The DOL delayed implementation for sixty days in response to considerations of 
the Obama Administration and concerns regarding statutory interpretations of some 
commenters to proposed and final regulations.  Investment Advice II, supra at 11847-48.  On 
May 22, 2009, the DOL delayed implementation of 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408g-1 to g-2, until 
November 22, 2009.  Investment Advice—Participants and Beneficiaries, 74 Fed. Reg. 23952 
(Friday, May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Investment Advice III] (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
2550).  DOL states that “[t]he Department believes that the complexity and significance of the 
issues involved justify delaying the effective and applicability dates of the final rule for an 
additional 180 days in order to afford the Department time for further review.”  Investment 
Advice III, supra at 23952. 
158 Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)); 29 
C.F.R § 2550.408g-1. 
159 Pension Protection Act § 601(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)); 29 
C.F.R § 2550.408g-1; see also infra Part III.A-B and accompanying notes (discussing the 
duties and liabilities of fiduciaries, such as plan administrators and trustees, under ERISA’s 
framework). 
160 Pension Protection Act § 611 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 4975(d) and 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1002(42), 1108(b), 1121(a)).  Section 611 creates exemptions from ERISA prohibited 
transaction rules for financial and other investment transactions that involve service providers, 
I.R.C. § 4975(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b), foreign exchange transactions and cross trading, 29 
U.S.C. § 1108(b), block trading, 29 U.S.C. § 1112(a), and bond relief and purchase and sale of 
a security between a plan and party in interest using an electronic communication network, 
I.R.C. § 4975(d)(19) and 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b).  Moreover, Section 611(f) also amends Section 
102(42) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42), by defining plan assets: 
(42) the term “plan assets” means plan assets as defined by such regulations as the 
Secretary may prescribe, except that under such regulations the assets of any entity 
shall not be treated as plan assets if, immediately after the most recent acquisition of 
any equity interest in the entity, less than 25 percent of the total value of each class of 
equity interest in the entity is held by benefit plan investors. For purposes of 
determinations pursuant to this paragraph, the value of any equity interest held by a 
person (other than such a benefit plan investor) who has discretionary authority or 
control with respect to the assets of the entity or any person who provides investment 
advice for a fee (direct or indirect) with respect to such assets, or any affiliate of such a 
person, shall be disregarded for purposes of calculating the 25 percent threshold.  An 
entity shall be considered to hold plan assets only to the extent of the percentage of the 
equity interest held by benefit plan investors.  For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
“benefit plan investor” means an employee benefit plan subject to part 4, any plan to 
which section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies, and any entity 
whose underlying assets include plan assets by reason of a plan’s investment in such 
entity. 
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Code (IRC) to create exemptions for prohibited financial investment transactions, 
such as block trading, bonding relief and electronic communication networks.162  
Finally, Section 612163 amends Section 408 to create an exemption that permits a 
fiduciary or party-in-interest to correct some otherwise but unknown prohibited 
transaction if the fiduciary, party-in-interest, or another party corrects the prohibited 
transaction within fourteen days after having discovered the prohibited transaction, 
or after one could have reasonably discovered it.164 
The PPA also grants administrative discretion to fiduciaries performing plan 
administration and asset management for particular investment decisions and 
transactions that are likely to expose these fiduciaries and plan sponsors to 
investment risk and financial liability.  The PPA amends ERISA to permit fiduciaries 
to invest assets in the individual accounts of plan participants who cannot, for one 
reason or another, manage these assets of their individual accounts.165  Section 621166 
amends Section 404167 of ERISA by limiting the fiduciary liability of plan 
administrators and other fiduciaries when the ability of participants or beneficiaries 
to direct investments has been suspended.168  Next, Section 624169 also amends 
Section 404 by permitting fiduciaries to give notice to plan participants and then 
“exercis[e] control over the assets in the account with respect to the amount of 
contributions and earnings which, in the absence of an investment election by the 
participant, are invested by the plan in accordance with regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary.”170  Section 624 limits the fiduciary liability of plan administrators by 
permitting a default investment transaction for plan participants in individual account 
plans, such as 401(k).171  Finally, Section 625172 amends Section 404 of ERISA to 
permit the annuity contract to be an optional form for the distribution of assets by 
                                                          
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(42) (citation omitted).  This definition of plan assets limits the classification 
of an entity’s assets as plan assets if an employee benefit plan does not hold twenty-five 
percent or more of the value of this entity’s equity assets.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42). 
161 ERISA § 408 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108 and I.R.C. 4975). 
162 Pension Protection Act § 611 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108 and I.R.C. § 
4975). 
163 Id. § 612 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)). 
164 Id. § 612(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)). 
165 Id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)). 
166 Id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)). 
167 ERISA § 404 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104). 
168 Pension Protection Act § 621(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)). 
169 Id. § 624 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. § 625 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104). 
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plan beneficiaries of individual account plans. 173  The use of this annuity contract for 
such a purpose is not subject to the safest available annuity standard,174 but it is 
subject to all other fiduciary standards.175  The PPA expands fiduciary discretion and 
control by limiting a fiduciary’s exposure to investment risk, market uncertainty, and 
financial liability.  This adjustment limits the ability of plan participants and 
beneficiaries to challenge low investment returns and financial losses of individual 
account funds of authorized investment or market transactions.176   
The PPA recognizes the need for individual investment advice for retirement 
planning.  Eventually, the PPA may reduce some investment risk and financial 
liability of defined-contribution plans, but it permits the transfer of risk and liability 
to plan participants in what appears to be a zero-sum game.  The PPA preserves 
organizational discretion of plan creation and extends plan discretion of plan 
administration and asset management by limiting the risk and liability of plan 
administrators, sponsors, and trustees for some investment transactions and 
practices.177 
B.  Enhancing Employees’ Asset Management, Ownership, and Participation 
The PPA expands the regulation of asset management and plan administration of 
individual account plans to provide investment opportunities for asset managers and 
plan participants.178  The PPA also preserves and limits organizational and 
administrative discretion of some asset management and administrative practices to 
improve retirement security.179  First, Section 901 amends Section 401(a)180 of the 
IRC.  Section 901 increases investment diversification of employers securities held 
by plan participants in their individual accounts of defined-contribution pension 
plans.181  Section 901 mandates that trustees and plan administrators provide plan 
participants an opportunity to divest employer securities allocated as contributions 
and an opportunity to reinvest funds of those securities in at least three other 
investment options that possess materially different risk and return characteristics 
                                                                 
173 Id. 
174 See 29 C.F.R § 2509.95-1 (2008).  Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 is entitled “Interpretive 
bulletin relating to the fiduciary standards under ERISA when selecting an annuity provider 
for a defined benefit pension plan.”  Id.  The purpose of  Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 is to 
“provide[] guidance concerning certain fiduciary standards . . . applicable to the selection of 
an annuity provider for the purpose of benefit distributions from a defined benefit pension plan 
(hereafter ‘pension plan’) when the pension plan intends to transfer liability for benefits to an 
annuity provider.”  Id. § 2509.95-1(a). 
175 Pension Protection Act § 625(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104). 
176 See id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)). 
177 See, e.g., id. § 621 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); id. § 624 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)); see supra Part IV.A and accompanying notes. 
178 See Pension Protection Act § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)). 
179 See id. 
180 Id. § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)). 
181 Pension Protection Act § 901(a)(1) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(a)(35)). 
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from employer’s securities.182  Second, Section 902 amends Section 401(k)183 of the 
IRC by permitting plan sponsors to create “qualified automatic contribution 
arrangement[s]” that enroll eligible employees who have not elected to participate in 
cash or deferred compensation plans when plan sponsors are making qualified 
contributions until employees decide to elect to participate.184  Third, Section 903 
amends Section 414185 of the IRC by establishing benefit, contribution, and notice 
requirements for the administration of eligible combined defined-benefit plans and 
qualified cash or deferred arrangements by treating each plan as if it were not a part 
of a combined plan.186  Obviously, Section 901 limits the transfer of risk and liability 
by requiring asset diversification; and Section 902 benevolently transfers risk and 
liability by permitting the enrollment of a plan participant in a defined-contribution 
plan when this participant would not otherwise receive contributions from his or her 
employer. 
The PPA increases the retirement security of younger employees who are forced 
to rely solely on defined-contribution plans for retirement savings.  Simply, it 
imposes faster vesting of employers’ contributions to employees’ individual plan 
accounts.187  Foremost, the PPA amends ERISA and IRC to provide faster vesting for 
defined-contribution plans.  Section 904(b)188 amends Section 203(a)(2)189 of ERISA, 
and Section 904(a)190 amends Section 411(a)(2) of the IRC.  ERISA and the Internal 
Revenue Code contain identical vesting schedules that include faster vesting for 
employers’ contributions to defined-contribution plans.191  In focusing only on 
ERISA’s vesting schedules, Section 904(b) amends Section 203(a)(2) of ERISA by 
requiring plan sponsors of defined-benefit plans to provide plan participants with one 
of two vesting schedules.192  First, ERISA’s five-year cliff vesting schedule requires 
employees to possess “a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of the employee’s 
accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.”193  Second, ERISA’s three- to 
seven-year graded vesting schedule requires employees to possess “a nonforfeitable 
right to a percentage of the employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer 
contributions determined under the . . . table” within this section.194  The PPA 
                                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Id. § 902 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k)(13)). 
184 Pension Protection Act § 902(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k)(13)). 
185 Id. § 903 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 414(x)). 
186 Id. § 903(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 414(x)). 
187 Id. § 904(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)). 
188 Id. § 904(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)). 
189 ERISA § 203(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)). 
190 Pension Protection Act § 904(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)). 
191 Id. § 904(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)). 
192 Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(i). 
193 Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
194 Id. § 904(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
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accords 20% for the third year and 20% each year thereafter with 100% vesting by 
the end of the seventh year 195   
Section 904(b) amends Section 203(a)(2) of ERISA by requiring plan sponsors of 
defined-contribution plans to provide plan participants with one of two vesting 
schedules.196  First, ERISA’s three-year cliff vesting schedule requires an employee 
to possess a “nonforfeitable right to one hundred percent of the employee’s accrued 
benefit derived from employer contributions.”197  Second, ERISA’s two- to three-
year graded vesting schedule requires an employee to possess “a nonforfeitable right 
to a percentage of the employee’s accrued benefit derived from employer 
contributions determined under the . . . table” within this section.198  The PPA 
accords 20% for the second year and 20% each year thereafter with 100% vesting by 
end of the sixth year.199   
In a curious twist, the PPA’s Section 904(b) graded and cliff vesting of an 
employer’s or a plan sponsors’ contributions to defined-contribution plans is the 
most liberal vesting or an early transfer of a nonforfeiture right to plan assets.200  
Section 904(b)’s liberal cliff and graded vesting schedules also transfer investment 
risk and financial liability for the management of the assets to plan participants and 
beneficiaries.201  Moreover, the PPA’s liberal cliff and graded vesting schedules 
reduce unallocated employer contributions.202  These schedules eliminate exercises 
of organizational discretion that would have been used to reallocate the employer’s 
contribution of nonvested assets.203  Plan participants who may have quit in year two 
or three before full vesting are now eligible for full or partial vesting in less time.204  
A restricted vesting schedule meant that more unallocated, but unvested, forfeitable 
contributions would have been retained by plan sponsors and, thereafter, reallocated 
to other employees as employer contributions or used by the plan sponsor for 
business needs.205  Consequently, one must conclude that new competition of the 
                                                                 
195 See id. 
196 Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(i). 
197 Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
198 Id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
199 See id.  
200 See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
201 See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
202 See id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
203 ERISA § 102(19) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19)).  ERISA establishes 
a claim that plan participants can pursue to recover vested or nonforfeitable benefits.  Id.  
ERISA states that: 
The term “nonforfeitable” when used with respect to a pension benefit or right means a 
claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or 
deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, 
which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan. . . .  
Id. 
204 See Pension Protection Act § 904(b)(2)(B)(ii); id. § 904(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
205 See ERISA § 102(19) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (19)). 
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global economy demanding more organizational discretion would likely favor 
restricted vesting schedules to acquire more flexibility and control over employers’ 
contributions by making the vesting period much longer.206   
C.  Increasing Access to Early Retirement and Availability of Welfare Benefits 
The PPA gives plan sponsors and plan participants an option for providing for 
employee welfare benefit needs of early retirement and pension benefit needs before 
full retirement.  This option avoids exposing plan participants or early retirees to 
unnecessary risk and liability by accepting early retirement.207  Some employees of 
private organizations may want to retire at age sixty-two and receive Social Security 
payments, but they may delay retirement if they cannot afford health care insurance 
on their retirement income.208  Section 905209 may be a solution to early retirement 
for some early retirees.  Section 905 permits plan participants to receive a retirement 
distribution from their pension plan at age sixty-two but continue to work for a few 
more years.  Section 905 amends Section 3(2)210 of ERISA.  Section 3(2) is the 
definition of an employee pension benefit plan and pension plan.211  Section 905 
permits a distribution of plan assets by an “employee who has attained age 62 and 
who is not separated from employment at the time of such distribution.”212  Section 
905 permits a distribution of plan funds or assets before the termination of covered 
                                                                 
206 See also Halperin, supra note 19, at 58-59 (calling for the immediate vesting of the 
employer’s contributions, though the employer wants to use its retirement plan as an incentive 
in reducing turnover). 
207 See Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)). 
208 See Report of the Working Group on Phased Retirement, November 14, 2000, 
approved by the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Plans (Advisory 
Council), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/phasedr1.htm (last visited on Nov. 10, 2009) 
[hereinafter Report on Phased Retirement] (The Advisory Council was to advise the Secretary 
of Labor in carrying our his or her duties under ERISA).  The Report on Phased Retirement 
states that: 
[P]hased retirement means a gradual change in a person’s work arrangements as a 
transition toward full retirement.  This may involve a change of employers (including 
self-employment), a change of career or a reduction in the number of hours 
worked. . . . 
 
A study by Joseph Quinn of Boston College indicates that one-third to one-half of 
American workers will work on a “bridge job” along the way to total retirement. 
. . . . 
Obstacles to Phased Retirement 
. . . .  
Loss of benefits:  Health care coverage is another concern for older workers.  By 
moving from full-time employment to part-time employment, an employee may lose 
access to company-subsidized health care coverage. 
Report on Phased Retirement, supra. 
209 Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)). 
210 Id. 
211 ERISA § 3(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)). 
212 Pension Protection Act § 905 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)). 
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employment (salary or income used to determine pension contributions and 
income).213  There appears to be no ERISA requirement that would require plan 
sponsors or employers to deny early retirees, who are still active employees, the right 
to participate in employee health care and other benefit plans.   
The PPA creates access to funds for employee and post-retirement health care 
benefits by giving plan sponsors more organizational discretion in the use of pension 
plan assets and permitting an income exclusion for plan participants in insurance 
contracts of welfare benefit plans.214  Section 841 amends Section 420 of the IRC by 
permitting plan sponsors of defined-benefit pension plans to transfer excess plan 
assets to a qualified post-retirement welfare benefit plan that will incur future health 
care liabilities.215  Section 842216 amends Section 420 of the IRC by permitting 
multiemployer pension plans to transfers excess pension assets to postretirement 
health benefit accounts.217  Next, the PPA permits greater use of cash assets to 
support health care benefit plans under Section 843.218  It amends Section 419A of 
the IRC by permitting plan sponsors of bona fide association health care plans to 
create or maintain a reserve for medical benefits in qualified asset accounts.219  In 
addition, Section 844 creates Section 72(e)(11) of the IRC and grants an exclusion 
from gross income for particular payments to a qualified long-term care insurance 
contract for any charge against the cash value of an annuity contract or the cash 
surrender value of a life insurance contract.220  Section 844 requires that this contract 
be a part of or a rider on this annuity or life insurance contract, but the investment in 
the contract is reduced but not below zero.221  The individual receiving the exclusion 
must file a return with the Secretary of the Treasury.222   
The PPA adjusts ERISA’s objectives and framework to limit and permit the 
transfer of risk and liability by preserving organizational discretion, extending 
administrative authority and discretion, and providing opportunities for more welfare 
and security gains.  Part V below analyzes LaRue to illustrate how the Court 
responds to the plan administration of defined-contribution plans that contain 
individual account plans that permit directed investment of funds in these accounts 
by plan participants under Section 404(c)(2) of ERISA.223  Specifically, the Court 
must decide what administrative practices can legitimately transfer investment risk 
and financial liability when plan participants rely on plan administrators to 
                                                                 
213 Id.  
214 Id. § 841(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 420(f)). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. § 842(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 420(a) and (e)(5)). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. § 843(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 419A). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. § 844(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 72 (e)(11)). 
221 Id.  
222 Id. § 844(d)(1)(a) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6050U). 
223 See ERISA § 404(c)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C § 1104(c)(2)). 
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implement directed investment decisions with little or no fiduciary liability under 
Section 404(c)(1)(A)(ii).224 
V.  LARUE AND ERISA CLAIMS, LIABILITIES, AND RELIEF 
ERISA can limit the transfer of social risk and liability by adjusting ERISA’s 
objectives and framework regulating administrative practices and actions that were 
created and used by plan administrators to execute directed investment decisions for 
individual account assets.  LaRue dealt directly with this substantive issue and 
alluded to a public policy concern in ascertaining the fiduciary obligation of a plan 
administrator, who allegedly breached a fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(2) by 
failing to execute the plan beneficiary’s directed investment decision for an 
individual account of a defined-contribution pension plan.225  In approaching this 
issue and concern from a different perspective, LaRue skirted ERISA’s objectives 
and framework in briefly discussing the plan participant’s rights under plan terms 
and Section 502(a)(1)(B) for a plan administrator’s failure to execute this 
participant’s directed investment decision.226  Obviously, LaRue’s impact on Section 
502(a) claims must be resolved to address the failure of the plan administrator to 
execute a plan participant’s or beneficiary’s directed investment decisions before 
there can be a full assessment of the transfer of investment risk, market uncertainty, 
or financial liability under ERISA’s trust or contract laws.  
A.  Section 502(a) Issues in the Administration of Individual Accounts 
The Federal Judiciary’s interpretation of ERISA may determine how ERISA’s 
objectives and framework limit or permit the transfer of risk and liability by a plan 
administrator using administrative practices and procedures to implement a directed 
investment decision of a plan participant who participates in a defined-contribution 
plan containing individual retirement plans.  To illustrate, the petitioner, LaRue, filed 
an ERISA claim against his former employer and respondent, DeWolff, Boberg & 
Associates (“DeWolff”) and its 401(k) retirement savings plan.227  The respondent 
administered its 401(k) retirement saving plan (“DeWolff Plan”), which was an 
individual account plan.  DeWolff permitted the petitioner and other plan 
participants to direct or make their investments of contributions under the DeWolff 
Plan’s procedures and requirements.228  In 2001 and 2002, petitioner alleged that he 
directed the DeWolff Plan to make certain changes to investments in his 401(k) 
retirement savings account.229  However, DeWolff never executed his directions.230 
The petitioner alleged that the DeWolff Plan did not implement his investment 
decision, which caused him to suffer account losses of $150,000.231  He claimed that 
                                                                 
224 See id. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
225 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022,1025 (2008). 
226 See id. at 1024 & n.3. 




231 Id. at 1022-23.   
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this failure “‘depleted’ his interest in the plan . . . [and] amounted to a breach of 
fiduciary duty under [ERISA].”232  Specifically, petitioner’s complaint sought 
equitable relief under Section § 502(a)(3).233  The respondent moved for summary 
judgment, stating that petitioner’s claim was for monetary relief and was, therefore, 
not permitted under Section 502(a)(3).234  Although petitioner argued that he was 
seeking only equitable relief, the district court agreed with the respondent and 
granted summary judgment because the respondent did not possess any contested or 
disputed funds belonging to petitioner.235 
The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit and argued that his claims under Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) requested 
only equitable relief.236  The Fourth Circuit found that petitioner’s Section 502(a)(2) 
claim had not been raised in the district court.  However, the court still decided the 
Section 502(a)(2) claim on the merits and concluded that ERISA’s framework and 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell’s holding237 would not permit an 
individual claimant to recover on an individual account within a defined-contribution 
plan under Section 502(a)(2) for a breach of a fiduciary duty when the petitioner was 
seeking only personal relief for monies or assets in his individual account and not the 
entire plan.238  In relying on Russell, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a Section 
502(a)(2) claim could only provide a remedy for the entire plan and not for an 
individual.239  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit rejected petitioner’s Section 502(a)(3) 
                                                                 
232 Id.  In LaRue, the Court does not reach the merit of a breach of fiduciary duty by 
respondent or the plan administrator and only “assume[s] that respondents breached fiduciary 
obligations defined in § 409(a), and that those breaches had an adverse impact on the value of 
the plan assets in petitioner’s individual account.  Whether petitioner can prove those 
allegations and whether respondents may have valid defenses to the claim are matters not 
before us.”  Id. at 1024.  Moreover, the Court is most explicit in noting that the economic 
value of a 401(k) account has no bearing on the determination of the breach of a fiduciary duty 
under Section 502(a)(2).  The Court states that “[a]lthough the record does not reveal the 
relative size of petitioner’s account, the legal issue under § 502(a)(2) is the same whether his 
account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan.”  Id.  Finally, the Court leaves 
several unanswered questions regarding the conduct or action of plan participants or the 
petitioner under the terms and conditions of the plans.  The Court does not “decide whether 
petitioner made the alleged investment directions in accordance with the requirements 
specified by the Plan, whether he was required to exhaust remedies set forth in the Plan before 
seeking relief in federal court pursuant to § 502(a)(2), or whether he asserted his rights in a 
timely fashion.”  Id. at 1024 n.3.   
233 Id. at 1023 (citing Civil Action No. 2:04-1747-18 (D.S.C.), p. 4, 2 Record, Doc. 1).   
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). 
237 Id. at 1023. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  The Court notes that “[r]elying on our decision in Russell, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that § 502(a)(2) ‘provides remedies only for entire plans, not for 
individuals. . . .  Recovery under this subsection must “inure[ ] to the benefit of the plan as a 
whole,” not to particular persons with rights under the plan.’”  Id. at 1022 (citing LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 450 F.3d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 2006)).  
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claim because he was not seeking equitable relief but, rather, a recovery of personal 
losses from only his account.240  The Fourth Circuit found that the individual account 
plan contained no plan assets and that the plan administrator executed the directed 
investment decision of the plan participant on behalf of the plan, and it concluded 
that this participant could not recover for losses from his individual account.241   
The Fourth Circuit would severely limit the fiduciary obligation of and impose 
little or no liability on plan administrators for administrative procedures and 
requirements that are likely to enlarge a prior transfer risk and liability to a plan 
participant who makes directed investment decisions that automatically transfer this 
risk and liability to plan participants.242  The Fourth Circuit’s conclusion would 
expand plan administrator’s discretion and control over defined-contribution plans 
containing individual accounts.243  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion would 
always leave transferring risk and liability with plan participants until the plan 
administrator chose to execute directed investment decisions under market 
uncertainty and investment risk. 
B.  Section 502(a)(2) Issue under Russell and Defined-Contribution Plans 
The petitioner did not share the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions on ERISA’s 
framework regarding who should bear the investment risk, financial liability, and 
market uncertainty for a plan administrator’s failure to timely implement a directed 
investment decision of a plan participant or beneficiary.  Consequently, the petitioner 
requested and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.244  The Court 
agreed to decide whether Section 502(a)(2) and Russell would “authorize[] a 
participant in a defined-contribution pension plan to sue a fiduciary whose alleged 
misconduct impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s individual 
account.”245  The Fourth Circuit misread Russell and “[w]hile language in our Russell 
opinion is consistent with that [Court of Appeals’] conclusion, the rationale for 
Russell’s holding supports the opposite result in . . . [LaRue].”246  “In Russell[, the 
Court] held that a participant in a disability plan that paid a fixed level of benefits 
could not bring suit under § 502(a)(2) of [ERISA] . . . to recover consequential 
damages arising from delay in the processing of her claim.”247  The Court had to 
consider whether its past precedent, ERISA’s present framework, and today’s use of 
defined-contribution plans justify allowing the plan participant to sue a fiduciary that 
                                                                 
240 Id. at 1023.  
241 Id. (citing LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572-73).  
242 See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes (discussing fiduciary duties, breaches and 
liability, and enforcement of fiduciary liability under ERISA’s framework). 
243 See LaRue, 450 F.3d at 572-73. 
244 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 551 U.S. 1130 (2007). 
245 LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs. Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1022 (2008). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
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had caused this plan participant to suffer a financial loss from a specific, identifiable 
individual account.248    
The petitioner’s claim arose under Section 502(a)(2),249 which “authorizes the 
Secretary of Labor as well as plan participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, to bring 
actions on behalf of a plan to recover for violations of the obligations defined in § 
409(a).”250  “The principal statutory duties imposed on fiduciaries by . . . [S]ection 
[502(a)(2)] ‘relate to the proper management, administration, and investment of fund 
assets’ . . . .”251  Section 502(a)’s purpose was to “ensur[e] that ‘the benefits 
authorized by the plan’ are ultimately paid to participants and beneficiaries.”252  The 
misconduct of a plan administrator in failing to perform the instructions of the plan 
participant “falls squarely within” Section 502(a)(2).253  Effectively, the Court 
                                                                 
248 Id.  For analysis of the merits of using Section 502(a)(2) to permit individual recovery 
of legal and equitable remedies, see Regina L. Readling, Rethinking “The Plan”: Why ERISA 
Section 502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan 
Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (2008).  Ms. Readling states that: 
In order to fully explain why ERISA has proven inadequate in providing remedies to 
defined contribution plan participants harmed by fiduciary breach, an examination of 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions is 
required.  In sum, the net effect of the Russell, Mertens, and Great-West decisions took 
away a substantial amount of protection and barred a number of potential remedies 
that should have been afforded to defined contribution plan participants aggrieved by a 
breach of fiduciary duty.  As will be discussed in detail below, application of the 
Russell precedent was used to bar recovery for breach of fiduciary duty under section 
502(a)(2) if the remedy inured to an individual, or an individual account.  Further, 
Mertens and Great-West drastically limited even the type of equitable relief an 
aggrieved participant could seek under section 502(a)(3). 
Readling, supra, at 333-34.   
249 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985)); see also 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1996) (noting that § 409’s fiduciary obligations 
“relat[e] to the plan’s financial integrity” and “reflec[t] a special congressional concern about 
plan asset management”).   
253 Id. Although the record before the Court did not show any lost profits suffered by the 
petitioner, the Court concluded that Section 502(a)(2) was still the appropriate claim in the 
management of trust assets.  Id. at 1024 n.4.  The Court  stated that: 
The record does not reveal whether the alleged $150,000 injury represents a decline in 
the value of assets that DeWolff should have sold or an increase in the value of assets 
that DeWolff should have purchased.  Contrary to respondents’ argument, however, § 
502(a)(2) encompasses appropriate claims for “lost profits.”  Under the common law 
of trusts, which informs our interpretation of ERISA’s fiduciary duties, trustees are 
“chargeable with . . . any profit which would have accrued to the trust estate if there 
had been no breach of trust,” including profits forgone because the trustee “fails to 
purchase specific property which it is his duty to purchase.”   
Id.  (citations omitted).  
In one of the concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, did 
not agree that petitioner, LaRue, had raised a Section 502(a)(2) claim in challenging the 
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created fiduciary parity under ERISA’s framework.  The administrative practices that 
support investment decisions made by participants of defined-contribution pension 
plans will be given the same fiduciary protections as those given to asset 
management practices that support investment decisions made by trustees or other 
fiduciaries of defined-benefit plans.254  This fiduciary parity does not allow plan 
administrators who exercise ineffective administrative procedures and impose 
requirements that implement directed investment decisions of individual accounts to 
transfer all risk and liability to plan participants and beneficiaries.255 
C.  Section 502(a)(2) to Recover for Individual Account Impairment 
ERISA does not permit the transfer of risk and liability by denying plan 
participants the benefits promised by their employee benefit plans, nor does it permit 
plan administrators to deny benefits that are granted by these plans.256  In LaRue, the 
Court stated that a fiduciary’s misconduct “in Russell . . . fell outside this category” 
in that “[t]he plaintiff in Russell received all of the benefits to which she was 
contractually entitled, but sought consequential damages arising from a delay in the 
processing of her claim.”257  Russell stressed that the fiduciary relationship of Section 
409(a) was with the plan, and the plan itself was the victim of the breach and entitled 
to recovery for such fiduciary breach.258  Next, the circumstances behind the 
enactment of ERISA by Congress were the ‘“misuse and mismanagement of plan 
                                                          
 
omission of the fiduciary.  Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Chief Justice Roberts, 
however, agreed with the Court’s conclusion that ERISA permits recovery for the breach of a 
fiduciary duty for failing to perform an investment transaction in a defined-contribution plan 
that consists of individual account plans and permitting directed investment by a plan 
participant.  Id.  Chief Justice Roberts stated that: 
LaRue’s right to direct the investment of his contributions was a right granted and 
governed by the plan.  In this action, he seeks the benefits that would otherwise be due 
him if, as alleged, the plan carried out his investment instruction.  LaRue’s claim, 
therefore, is a claim for benefits that turns on the application and interpretation of the 
plan terms, specifically those governing investment options and how to exercise them.   
Id.  It is at least arguable that a claim of this nature properly lies only under § 502(a)(1)(B) of 
ERISA.  That provision allows a plan participant or beneficiary “to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  It is 
difficult to imagine a more accurate description of LaRue’s claim.  And, in fact, claimants 
have filed suit under § 502(a)(1)(B) alleging similar benefit denials in violation of plan terms.  
Id. (citing Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(discussing an “allegation made under § 502(a)(1)(B) that a plan administrator wrongfully 
denied instruction to move retirement funds from employer’s stock to a diversified investment 
account”); LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (other citations omitted). 
254 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (recognizing that particular asset management or 
administrative duties are enforceable under Section 502(a)(2)). 
255 See id. 
256 See ERISA § 502(a)(2) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)). 
257 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024 (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37).  
258 Id. (citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 140).  
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assets by plan administrators’” 259 and that the sum of the purpose of Section 
502(a)(2) and Section 409 is to “protect the ‘financial integrity of the plan . . . .’”260  
In LaRue, ERISA’s framework takes ineffective administrative practices that transfer 
investment risk and financial liability to plan participants and beneficiaries of 
defined-contribution pension plans that contain individual accounts managed by 
these participants and beneficiaries and exposes those practices to fiduciary 
liability.261 
The history and nature of the defined-contribution pension plan justify a Section 
502(a)(2) claim to protect individual accounts from a breach of a fiduciary duty.262  
Foremost, the Court concluded that the dominant use of defined-contribution plans 
would not support “Russell’s emphasis on protecting the ‘entire plan’ from fiduciary 
misconduct . . . .”263  Defined-contribution pension plans are preferred by employers 
in the retirement plan market.264  “In contrast, when ERISA was enacted, and when 
Russell was decided, ‘the [defined-benefit] plan was the norm of American pension 
practice.’”265  Next, the defined welfare benefit plan in Russell266 is unlike the 
defined-contribution pension plan in LaRue.  Russell’s disability plan did not contain 
employees’ individual plan accounts, but rather, it paid a disability benefit based on a 
                                                                 
259 Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 141 n.8). 
260 Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9). 
261 Id. at 1024. 
262 See id. at 1025.   
263 Id.  In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, did not 
agree that the proliferation of defined contribution plans in the private sector justifies moving 
away from Russell’s protection of the entire plan.  Id. at 1028 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
Justices Thomas and Scalia, however, still agreed with the Court’s conclusion that Section 
502(a)(2) applies to individual accounts of defined contribution plans.  Id.  Justice Thomas 
also stated, “Although I agree with the majority’s holding, I write separately because my 
reading of §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) is not contingent on trends in the pension plan market.  Nor 
does it depend on the ostensible ‘concerns’ of ERISA’s drafters.”  Id.  
264 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing David Rajnes, An Evolving Pension System: 
Trends in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans (Employee Benefit Research 
Institute) Sept. 2002, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0902ib.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2009); Facts from EBRI: Retirement Trends in the United States Over the Past 
Quarter-Century (Employee Benefit Research Institute) June 2007, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0607fact.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009)). 
265 Id. (citing JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE, & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 58 (4th ed. 2006); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined 
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004) (discussing the “significant reversal of 
historic patterns under which the traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant paradigm 
for the provision of retirement income”). 
266 Russell, 473 U.S. at 136 (“Respondent Doris Russell, a claims examiner for petitioner 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company . . . is a beneficiary under two employee 
benefit plans administered by petitioner for eligible employees.  Both plans are funded from 
the general assets of petitioner and both are governed by ERISA.”).   
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formula that used the employee or plan participants’ compensation.”267  Russell 
focused on those plans that pay a defined benefit or fixed amount and found that 
misconduct by fiduciaries of these plans does not affect individual accounts that 
actually do not exist.268  The characteristics of defined-benefit plans prompted 
Congress to reduce the risk of default by imposing funding requirements and 
requiring insurance with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to 
protect against unfunded or underfunded plan termination.269  Consequently, 
“[w]hether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all participants and 
beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the 
kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409.”270  Russell’s concerns with the 
entire plan, “which accurately reflect the operation of § 409 in the defined-benefit 
context, are beside the point in the defined-contribution context.”271  Finally, other 
provisions of ERISA are consistent with the Court’s conclusion on asset 
management of individual accounts when fiduciaries are “exempt[ed] . . . from 
liability for losses caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their 
individual accounts.”272   
In LaRue, the Court held “that although § 502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy 
for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize 
recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s 
individual account.”273  One concurring opinion agreed with Court’s holding but 
based the Court’s interpretation of Section 502(a)(2) solely on the text of ERISA and 
not the dominance of defined-contribution plans.274  The other concurring opinion of 
LaRue also considered allowing LaRue, a plan participant, to file a Section 
502(a)(1)(B) claim because his allegations may be no more than a denial of benefits 
under the terms and conditions of the defined-contribution plan.275   
LaRue can limit the transfer of risk and liability to plan participants and 
beneficiaries when plan administrators used or relied on ineffective administrative 
acts and practices to execute or implement directed investment decisions of 
individual account plans.  This limit places the risk and liability for losses of account 
funds on plan administrators who create and fail to execute administrative acts and 
                                                                 
267 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing Russell v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 
486 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
268 Id. 
269 Id. (citing Zelinsky, supra note 265, at 475-78). 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2007)).   
273 Id. at 1026. 
274 Id. at 1028 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justices Scalia and Thomas did not agree that the 
increased use of defined-contribution plans should be considered in the interpretation of 
Section 502(a)(2).  Id. 
275 Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy did 
not agree that LaRue had raised a Section 502(a)(2) claim in challenging the omissions of the 
fiduciary.  Id.  
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practices.  Section 502(a)(2) permits a plan participant of a defined-contribution plan 
that contains individual accounts to file an ERISA claim for breach of a fiduciary 
duty by the plan administrator for failing to execute a directed investment decision.276 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF LARUE AND THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT  
The implications and impact of the PPA and LaRue on maintaining employee 
welfare and retirement security gains must be assessed in view of the need of plan 
sponsors, plan administrators, and asset managers to transfer social risk and financial 
liability in business management, plan administration, and asset management of 
employee benefit plans.  This transfer of risk and liability also includes considering 
the implications and impact of PPA and LaRue on the need to maintain 
organizational discretion and administrative control of plan sponsors and plan 
administrators, respectively.  LaRue signals that the use of administrative procedures 
and practices can transfer risk and liability in a slightly different manner than 
employment contracts and trust arrangements of the common law; but they do so 
with similar retirement social welfare consequences, namely the loss of retirement 
savings.277  Although the PPA addressed and imposed limits on the transfer of risk 
and liability to employees and retirees, the PPA still permits fiduciaries to transfer 
risk and liability by exercising administrative discretion; and it allows employers to 
transfer risk and liability by exercising organizational discretion.  Therefore, 
Congress must come to grips with the fact that the impact of more foreign 
competition and less American economic standing and competitiveness could mean 
more unfavorable business outcomes and social consequences, which includes the 
transfer of more risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government.   
A.  LaRue and Fiduciary Liability, Breaches, and Remedies 
LaRue is consistent with ERISA’s objectives and framework, even though LaRue 
creates a Section 502(a)(2) breach of fiduciary duty claim for impairment of 
individual accounts by a plan administrator.278  LaRue does not restrict plan sponsors 
who want to provide fewer employee welfare and retirement benefits.279  Plan 
sponsors can continue to make discretionary contributions to defined-contribution 
pension and welfare benefit plans.280  LaRue does not greatly interfere with the 
administrative discretion and control of plan administrators over defined-
contribution pension plans permitting directed investment decisions.281   
LaRue recognizes a fundamental change in employers’ creation of pension 
benefit plans, reaffirms the nature of different kinds of employee benefit plans, and 
                                                                 
276 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026. 
277 See Protecting the Pensions, supra note 19, at 2.  “A generation ago, Congress took 
action to safeguard pensions in response to an Enron-like debacle at Studebaker.  These 
protections for defined benefit plans included diversification requirements and Government 
insurance.”  Id. (statement of Senator Kennedy). 
278 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26; see supra Part V. C and accompanying notes. 
279 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. at 1025-26. 
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continues to deny recovery for personal injuries under ERISA’s framework.282  
Foremost, a substantial change in granting pension benefits has taken place since 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.283  “In contrast, when ERISA was enacted, and 
when Russell was decided, ‘the [defined-benefit] plan was the norm of American 
pension practice.’”284  Moreover, the Court distinguished the defined-benefit welfare 
(disability benefit) plan in Russell285 from the defined-contribution pension 
(retirement account) plan in LaRue.286  “[T]he disability plan at issue in Russell did 
not have individual accounts; it paid a fixed benefit based on a percentage of the 
employee’s salary.”287  Finally, the Court was consistent in its refusal to award 
compensatory damages under ERISA’s objectives and framework for the 
enforcement of rights of plan participants and beneficiaries under plan terms and 
ERISA fiduciary obligations.  LaRue is consistent with Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates288 and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson289 on the kind 
of remedy that plan participants and beneficiaries can recover under ERISA.290  
LaRue permits only equitable relief.291  Although the plan participant can recover 
losses of profits from individual accounts, the only recovery under Sections 
502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) is equitable relief.  LaRue permits recovery only for lost 
profits under trust law and does not permit recovery for personal injuries under a 
common law remedy.292 
The impact of LaRue on the fiduciary obligations and liability of plan 
administrators and plan sponsors is quite manageable under administrative 
procedures and ERISA procedural safeguards.293  Plan sponsors and administrators 
need only address the administrative procedures and requirements that are likely to 
contain or cause disputed administrative acts and practices that would breach a 
                                                                 
282 See id.  
283 See id. at 1025. 
284 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (citing LANGBEIN,  supra note 265, at 471 (discussing the 
“significant reversal of historic patterns under which the traditional defined benefit plan was 
the dominant paradigm for the provision of retirement income”). 
285 Russell, 473 U.S. at 136.   
286 LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025. 
287 Id. (citing Russell, 722 F.2d at 486). 
288 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding that plan participant could 
not recover money damages against a nonfiduciary where the participant alleged he had 
suffered losses as a result of the nonfiduciary’s participation in a breach of a fiduciary duty). 
289 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (holding that 
insurance company could not recover under a legal or at-law remedy when it attempted to 
recover under restitution for benefits it had conferred on a beneficiary). 
290 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025. 
291 See id. at 1026. 
292 See id. 
293 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025; see supra Part V.C and accompanying notes. 
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fiduciary duty and result in liability.294  Plan participants may not use Section 
502(a)(1)(B) to challenge plan procedures or ERISA procedural safeguards because 
Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims are normally about the denial of benefits and other 
claims under the plan terms and conditions.295  These participants will not be 
permitted under ERISA to challenge the exercise of authority and discretion by plan 
administrators and trustees.296 
B.  Limits of LaRue in Pursuing Section 502(a) Claims  
LaRue’s impact on the transfer of risk and liability is not fully known or 
understood under Section 502(a) because the Court relied on factual assumptions and 
left unresolved issues to address the Section 502(a)(2) claim.297  Specifically, LaRue 
relies on the assumption of a breach of fiduciary duty, gives little or no weight to the 
economic value of individual accounts in challenging administrative practices, and 
places great weight on resolving disputes under Section 502(a)(2) claims that are 
likely to avoid ERISA procedural safeguards.298  Foremost, the Court did not reach 
the merits of the claim of a breach of a fiduciary duty by respondents as plan 
administrators, but it “assume[d] that respondents breached fiduciary obligations 
defined in § 409(a), and that those breaches had an adverse impact on the value of 
the plan assets in petitioner’s individual account.”299  On this issue, the Court stated, 
“Whether petitioner can prove those allegations and whether respondents may have 
valid defenses to the claim are matters not before us.”300  Next, the Court was most 
explicit in noting that the economic value of the 401(k) individual account has no 
bearing on the issue of the determination of the breach of a fiduciary duty under 
Section 502(a)(2).301  The Court stated that “[a]lthough the record does not reveal the 
relative size of petitioner’s account, the legal issue under § 502(a)(2) is the same 
whether his account includes 1% or 99% of the total assets in the plan.”302  What 
remains is that the Federal Judiciary must scrutinize substantive issues to determine 
if the transfer of risk and liability to plan participants under ERISA’s objectives and 
framework is reasonable when plan sponsors and administrators who permit directed 
investment decisions are allowed to transfer the investment risk and financial 
                                                                 
294 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025. 
295  See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025, 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  LaRue’s majority and 
concurring opinions agree on the need to protect plan procedures and ERISA safeguards not 
subject to scrutiny under Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims that are based primarily on plan terms.  
See generally id. 
296 See supra Part III.B; see also LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025, 1027 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
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liability to plan participants and beneficiaries for these administrators’ untimely 
performance of the investment transactions.303 
In LaRue, the Court also leaves unsettled questions regarding the distinction 
between Section 502(a)(2) and Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims.304  It firmly recognizes 
the need to preserve ERISA procedural safeguards and the standard of review for 
plan administrators’ decisions that are challenged by plan participants and 
beneficiaries under Section 502(a)(1)(B).305  Chief Justice Roberts stated, “I do not 
mean to suggest that these are settled questions.  They are not.  Nor are we in a 
position to answer them.”306  Since the petitioner LaRue had raised only a Section 
502(a)(2) claim, the Court would not decide whether a Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim 
was appropriate on the facts.307  In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts points 
out the danger of not addressing this question, when he stated that “[a]llowing a § 
502(a)(1)(B) action to be recast as one under § 502(a)(2) might permit plaintiffs to 
circumvent safeguards for plan administrators that have developed under § 
502(a)(1)(B).”308  Thus, a substantial fiduciary need exists to preserve and protect 
ERISA and plan procedural safeguards that are relied on or used by plan 
administrators to deny benefits, reimburse benefit claims, and other actions of plan 
administration and asset management.   
The federal courts must not review numerous Section 502(a)(2) claims for a 
breach of fiduciary duties when these claims do not follow ERISA safeguards and 
plan procedures as required by Section 502(a)(1)(B).309  Section 502(a)(2) should not 
be a bypass around Section 502(a)(1)(B) via a trip to federal courts.  Equally 
important, these denials of federal review protect the deferential standard of review 
applied by federal courts to scrutinize plan administrator and trustee’s decisions that 
interpret plan terms.310  These denials prevent Section 502(a)(2) claims from placing 
artificial substantive restrictions on the administrative authority or discretion of plan 
administrators responding to requests for benefits and other actions.311  This 
discretion is granted to plan administrators so that they may “determin[e] benefit 
eligibility and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review only for 
an abuse of discretion.”312   
                                                                 
303 See id. at 1024-25.  
304 Id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
305 Id. 
306 Id.  
307 Id. (“LaRue did not rely on § 502(a)(1)(B) as a source of relief, and the courts below 
had no occasion to address the argument, raised by an amicus in this Court, that the 
availability of relief under § 502(a)(1)(B) precludes LaRue’s fiduciary breach claim.” (citing 
Brief for ERISA Indus. Comm. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,  2007 WL 
2679382, *13-30 (2007))).  
308 Id. 
309 See id. 
310 Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). 
311 See id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
312 Id. (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115). 
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In the aftermath of LaRue, some confusion and uncertainty remain in the Federal 
Judiciary’s review of Section 502(a)(2) claims that respond to a breach of fiduciary 
duty for the administration of individual accounts of defined-contribution pension 
plans.313  The nature and cause of fiduciary liability are not entirely clear because the 
merits of the fiduciary breach of duty were never addressed by the Court.  Next, an 
issue regarding the selection of a Section 502(a)(2) or 502(a)(1)(B) claim to resolve 
benefit claim disputes was not fully resolved by the Court in LaRue.314  Protecting 
ERISA procedural safeguards and requirements play a paramount role in selecting a 
Section 502(a)(2) or Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty in 
the administration of individual accounts.315  A Section 502(a) claim is less likely to 
disturb the authority granted to plan administrators under ERISA procedural 
safeguards, and the deferential standard of review granted to plan administrators 
under employee benefit plan fits best with ERISA’s objectives and framework.316   
LaRue permits a broad exercise of organizational discretion and administrative 
authority by protecting the use of ERISA procedural safeguards and plan 
procedures.317  This broad exercise permits the transfer of risk and liability by 
permitting plan administrators to interpret plan terms, deny benefit claims or make 
other plan decisions where ERISA and plan procedures and requirements must be 
followed to file a claim under ERISA’s enforcement provisions.  
C.  Implications of LaRue and PPA for ERISA’s Enforcement 
LaRue’s interpretation of Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(1)(B) fits well with the 
context of ERISA’s objectives and framework.318  Yet, the PPA takes plan 
participants and beneficiaries who acquire investment advice from fiduciary advisers 
to manage individual account assets and exposes them to new investment risk, more 
market uncertainty and greater financial liability; and the PPA will raise new 
disputes under Section 502(a) regarding the integrity of some financial advice.319  
The PPA protects defined-benefit pension plans, increases the stability of defined-
                                                                 
313 Id. at 1024 & n.3. 
314 Id. at 1027 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
315 Id.  
316 See id. 
317 See id. at 1024. 
318 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26; supra Part VI.A and accompanying notes.  The 
Court states that “[m]ost significant is § 404(c), which exempts fiduciaries from liability for 
losses caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their individual accounts.  See 
also 29 C.F.R.§ 2550.404c-1 (2007).  This provision would serve no real purpose if, as 
respondents argue, fiduciaries never had any liability for losses in an individual account.”  See 
LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26. 
319 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 601(a)(1), 120 Stat. 780, 952-
53 (2006) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)).  Section 
406(b) prohibits financial and other transactions between the plan fiduciary and plan 
participants under ERISA’s framework.  ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 406(b), 88 Stat. 829, 
879 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
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contribution pension plans,320 and increases the opportunity for funding of some 
health care benefits.321  At most, LaRue protects individual accounts of defined-
contribution pension plans from a breach of fiduciary duty by a plan administrator 
who used an inadequate administrative practice to execute a directed investment 
decision.322   
The PPA may increase the exposure of individual account assets to investment 
risk, financial liability, and market uncertainty.  This exposure may lead to more 
Section 502(a) claims.  Section 601323 of the PPA amends Section 408—Exempted 
Transactions324 —of ERISA to permit fiduciary advisers to offer investment advice 
to plan participants and beneficiaries of defined-contribution pension plans that 
contain individual accounts.325  Section 408 creates an eligible investment 
arrangement that permits a fiduciary adviser to provide investment advice to plan 
participants and beneficiaries, but ERISA’s framework for fiduciary duties and 
liability governs the decisions and practices of fiduciary advisers.326  Eventually, plan 
participants and beneficiaries will use financial advice and education, but they will 
suffer substantial losses of assets or funds from their individual accounts due to 
unforeseen or unexpected market risk and uncertainty.  Some plan participants and 
                                                                 
320  See supra Part IV.B (discussing PPA provisions that provide access to financial 
advising for plan participants in individual account plans, faster vesting, and permit 
distribution for retirement while the participant is still working). 
321 See supra Part IV.C (discussing PPA provisions that permit employers or plan sponsors 
to transfer excess pension funds to health care plans and exclude from gross income to pay for 
long-term care insurance). 
322 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26. 
323 See infra note 330 and accompanying text. 
324 ERISA § 408(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(a)). 
325 See infra note 330 and accompanying text. 
326 Pension Protection Act § 601(a)(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14)); 
see also supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing the eligible investment 
arrangement of the PPA and its implementation by the Department of Labor).  Congress and 
the Department of Labor (DOL) do not want American workers managing their retirement 
accounts with little or no financial investment advice and education for consumption, 
retirement, and estate planning.  See Investment Advice I, supra note 157, at 3822.  Moreover, 
the DOL must never allow fiduciary advisers who give investment and planning advice to 
transfer risk and liability by financial, professional, and administrative procedures and 
requirements.  The hundreds of billions of dollars in defined-contribution plans and individual 
retirement accounts (IRA) must lead the DOL to consider the impact of eligible investment 
advice arrangements on financial markets and institutions.  DOL should talk to the Department 
of Treasury, Department of Commerce, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to 
understand the impact of these arrangements on the American and Global financial systems.  
These agencies need to examine how institutional practices, ERISA fiduciary standards, and 
professional certifications could eventually impact the redistribution or reallocation of market 
uncertainty, financial liability, and investment risk under an eligible investment advice 
arrangement.  Curiously, the DOL has found it extremely difficult to implement eligible 
investment arrangements that would provide investment advice and education to plan 
participants and beneficiaries under ERISA’s newly created statutory exemption from 
prohibited transactions.  See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. 
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beneficiaries may make allegations of inadequate or improper financial advice.  We 
cannot predict the future, but it should not be surprising if, after LaRue, a few plan 
participants and beneficiaries file Section 502(a) claims and pursue litigation when 
they do not receive satisfactory answers or responses for losses from individual 
accounts.327  LaRue indicates that newly created fiduciary advisers should avoid 
using loosely structured financial counseling practices that are not responsive to the 
investment needs of plan participants and beneficiaries making directed investment 
decisions for individual accounts.328  ERISA claims may arise when these practices 
do not provide timely information or permit timely use of advice and provide an 
investment option unfamiliar to plan participants.329 
Section 502(a) claims play a role in deciding whether federal courts will permit 
or limit the transfer of risk and liability to employees and retirees in interpreting 
statutory provisions or sections of ERISA’s framework in response to business 
outcomes and social consequences, such as permanent layoffs and pension plan 
                                                                 
327 See also LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26.  The Court recognizes that a fiduciary cannot be 
exempted from all liability for directed investment decisions by plan participants.  See id.   
328 See id. 1024-25 (“Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all 
participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it 
creates the kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409. . . .”).  
329 See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.  Individual accounts of defined-
contribution welfare benefit plans may be implicated by LaRue, but complete analysis is 
beyond the scope of this article.  LaRue points out that Russell’s defined-benefit plan actually 
includes payment for a welfare benefit plan, which was a disability benefit.  Conceivably, 
LaRue could extend to health care, educational, and other individual benefit accounts of 
defined-contribution welfare benefit plans.  LaRue’s Section 502(a)(2), codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2009), would be a claim preferred by plan 
participants who would allege a breach of a fiduciary duty for an inept administrative practice 
that denies timely services and accurate responses to benefit claims.  They would allege that 
ineffective administrative practices do not permit timely actions and decisions by plan 
administrators.  Yet, Section 502(a)(1)(B), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(b) 
(2006 & Supp. II 2009), may present a hurdle where the Court insists on protecting ERISA. 
plan procedures, and plan requirements so that plan administrators can exercise discretion in 
interpreting plan terms and responding to requests for benefits.  However, LaRue is a Section 
502(a)(2) claim, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), brought by a plan participant 
on behalf of his own individual account and may not extend beyond its original facts and 
circumstances.  One must ask whether LaRue’s Section 502(a)(2) claim would apply to other 
defined-contribution benefits that use individual accounts administered by plan administrators 
solely on behalf of plan participants of defined-contribution plans.  LaRue finds the type and 
nature of the employee benefit plan relevant in determining whether Section 502(a)(2) applies 
to a breach of a fiduciary duty for individual accounts.  LaRue requires only that the benefit 
plan cannot pay a fixed amount and must consist of individual accounts.  Again, the presence 
of confusion and uncertainty in distinguishing between Section 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(2) 
claims may present a hurdle when plan participants are trying to avoid following plan and 
ERISA procedural safeguards to challenge an administrator’s decision.  This confusion leaves 
the nature of a Section 502(a)(2) claim for the impairment of individual accounts providing 
only welfare benefits difficult to resolve under Section 502(a)(2).  In LaRue, the Court 
assumed the breach of a fiduciary duty and focused on protecting ERISA procedural 
safeguards.  LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025.  Section 502(a)(2) claims seem most uncertain when 
the dispute is decided on the merits and includes compliance with ERISA procedures and 
requirements.   
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modifications.330  The widespread use of individual accounts and their protection 
from incomplete and untimely administrative practices creates the need to consider 
the nature and utility of Section 502(a) claims.331  In particular, these claims protect 
the application or request for pension and welfare benefits by plan participants and 
beneficiaries under the plan’s terms and ERISA procedural safeguards.332  These 
claims also guarantee the execution of investment decisions and integrity of 
investment advice by plan administrators under fiduciary obligations.333  The Court 
and Congress must eventually decide when a Section 502(a) claim should restrict the 
discretion and control of plan administrators and when it should limit organizational 
discretion and flexibility of plan sponsors, who allocate and reallocate risk and 
liability of employee benefit plans.   
The enforcement issues of Section 502(a) are important in determining whether 
plan sponsors and administrators are transferring too much risk and liability under 
ERISA’s objectives and framework.  Several regulatory concerns and business risks 
and opportunities make the transfer of risk and liability most inviting to plan 
sponsors and administrators, who must manage business risk and liability in response 
to domestic business and social needs of a global economy.  These concerns include 
the receipt of only equitable relief,334 judicial focus on protecting ERISA and plan 
procedures,335 fiduciary standards and deference to protecting administrative 
discretion,336 contract terms preserving organizational discretion,337 and a slow 
legislative response to an erosion of retirement security.338  These concerns coexist 
with business opportunities that demand the management and reallocation of social 
risk and personal liability to employees and retirees under ERISA’s objectives and 
framework.339  Once business organizations transfer too much risk and liability to the 
                                                                 
330 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1024-25.  The Court recognizes that Section 502(a) protects 
the financial integrity of the plan and claims for benefits under the plan.  See id.   
331 See id. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
332 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
333 Id. at 1024-25. 
334 See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Mertens v. 
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
335 See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  “Equally significant, this 
Court has held that ERISA plans may grant administrators and fiduciaries discretion in 
determining benefit eligibility and the meaning of plan terms, decisions that courts may review 
only for an abuse of discretion.  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Burch, 489 U.S. 101, 155 
(1989).”  Id. at 1027. 
336 See id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
337 See id. at 1026-27 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
338 See, e.g., Protecting the Pension, supra note 19, at 1; Foundation of Health Care, 
supra note 32, at 1.  Congress conducted legislative hearings to investigate public policy 
concerns regarding retirement security and employee welfare two to three years before the 
enactment of the Pension Protection Act. 
339 Retirement Security Crisis, supra note 125, at 2 (recognizing that American businesses 
are entering the knowledge and innovation economy).    
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public, this transfer becomes no more than a redistribution or externalization of 
social liability and costs to government social programs. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
ERISA eventually may need to adjust to the transfer of social welfare risk and 
liability to further its policy objectives and statutory framework.  LaRue and the PPA 
signal that ERISA’s framework and objectives can be adjusted to maintain employee 
welfare and retirement security gains that are comparable with those of the last 
quarter of the twentieth century.340  However, it remains to be seen whether ERISA 
can continue to adjust to the transfer of risk and liability occurring more frequently 
in a more competitive and dominating global economy.  If American employers do 
not broadly meet global competition or improve economic standing, they will face 
new business outcomes, creating undesirable social consequence.341  Thereafter, they 
will transfer more risk and liability to employees, retirees, and government.   
Business decision-makers and public policy-makers must come to grips with the 
fact that catalytic competition can transform foreign labor, technology, and talent 
into a more competitive mixture in the presence of global capital.  In addition, less 
American economic standing may create another hurdle for business markets, 
industries, and organizations.342  This competition and standing may cause more 
unfavorable business outcomes and social consequences that are capable of eroding 
the protection gained by employees and retirees under ERISA’s objectives and 
framework.  This erosion of employee welfare and retirement security gains may 
take place even faster when stiffer competition and poor standing increase the 
frequency and kinds of unfavorable business outcomes.343  Corporate policy-makers 
and business decision-makers must respond to global competition and may need to 
overcome a lower economic standing to avoid or minimize unfavorable business 
outcomes and social consequences, thus minimizing the transfer of risk and 
liability.344   
If American markets, industries, and organizations cannot meet this competition 
and improve their standing in the global economy, Congress and the Federal 
Judiciary will be faced with the task of reexamining ERISA’s objectives and 
framework.  Congress can choose to do nothing, or it can provide more employee 
welfare and retirement security in response to a transfer of too much risk and 
liability.  In accomplishing the latter, Congress would need to adjust ERISA’s 
framework to increase access to employee welfare and retirement benefits.  Congress 
has several legislative options.  It can provide tax incentives and financial subsidies 
to encourage employers to provide more employment, postemployment, and 
postretirement benefits.  Congress can also assist in rebuilding or retooling American 
                                                                 
340 See supra Part VI and accompanying notes (discussing the impact and implications of 
LaRue and the PPA on transferring social risk and liability). 
341 See id. 
342 See Altman, supra note 4, at 11 (stating that the global financial crisis will force the 
United States to operate from a smaller platform); Siddiqi, supra note 4, at 48 (forecasting 
stiffer business competition for the U.S. and other western nations in the global economy). 
343 Retirement Security Crisis, supra note 125, at 2. 
344 Id. 
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/6
2009] A PRIMER ON THE NEED TO CONTINUE MONITORING 861 
 
industries, finding new markets, and improving business management to increase 
competitiveness and economic standing.  While Congress is considering what to do, 
the Federal Judiciary will eventually be asked to decide when retirees, employees, 
and the government must accept the denial, termination, or modification of health 
care, retirement, and other benefit plans under ERISA’s framework.  Eventually, 
federal policy-makers must decide who will bear the burden of unfavorable business 
outcomes and social consequences, such as plant closings and plan terminations, 
which cause the reallocation of social welfare risk and liability in view of more 
foreign (catalytic) competition and less American economic standing of the global 
economy.345 
                                                                 
345 See Retirement Security Crisis, supra note 125, at 2. 
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